| Contemporary Ethical Theory | Richard Lee |
| Philosophy 4133 | Autumn 2006 |
[Be sure you are familiar with the format and ground rules for this exam.]
Questions will be referred to by their "names," listed to their left.
| "Name" | Question |
|---|---|
| MV-RUS | What does Mavrodes in "Religion and the Queerness of Morality" mean by a "Russellian world?" Why does Mavrodes think "morality is queer in a Russellian world?" Why does he think morality is not queer in a non-Russellian world? Critically discuss. |
| MV-EUT | Explain the reasons for rejecting the view that moral wrongness simply is the property of being contrary to God's commands. What place in moral theory might a theist find for God despite these objections? Critically discuss. |
| N-AGEN | Explain the distinction Thomas Nagel draws between "agent-relative" and "agent-neutral" reasons. Give examples of each sort of reason (or explain why there are no such examples). How, according to Nagel, does this distinction differ from that between "internal" and "external" reasons? Are there internal agent-neutral reasons? If so, give an example. If not, explain why not. Are there external agent-relative reasons? If so, give an example. If not, explain why not. Critically discuss. |
| N-PAIN | What reason do we have, according to Nagel, for wanting someone else not to be in pain? What kind of reason does Nagel think this is? Explain. Are Nagel's views of this correct? Why or why not? |
| R-PFD | What does W. D. Ross mean by "prima facie duty?" Are all duties prima facie? Explain. |
| R-DUTY | List and explain the kinds of prima facie duties Ross thinks we have. Is his list complete? Is there anything on his list that shouldn't be there? Is there any way to compress the list to include fewer divisions. Explain. |
| R-OBJN | Ross imagines as an objection to his theory that "that there are these various and often conflicting types of prima facie duties leaves us with no principle upon which to discern what is our actual duty in particular circumstances." What is his response to this objection? Is it satisfactory? |
| R-INTU | What views of Ross's make it appropriate to classify him as an intuitionist? Explain. |
| F-TWO | Explain the "two different uses of words such as `should' and `ought'" that Philippa Foot finds in "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives?" What, if anything, does this difference have to do with the nature of morality? Critically discuss. |
| F-ETI | What similarities and differences does Philippa Foot find, in "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives," between moral judgments and judgments in matters of etiquette? Critically discuss. |
| F-DES | Near the end of "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives" Philippa Foot considers an objection to her view that morality consists of hypothetical imperatives. She writes, "It will be said that this way of viewing moral considerations must be totally destructive of morality, because no one could ever act morally unless he accepted such considerations as in themselves sufficient reason for action." Explain this objection. Explain Foot's reply. Critically discuss. |
| F-VOL | At the end of "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives" Philippa Foot speaks of "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice ..." Explain her remark in light of the views expressed in that paper concerning the nature of morality. Critically discuss. |
| HR-FEAT | What are the "two logical features" of the word "ought" that R. M. Hare thinks are essential to understanding moral argument? Carefully explain each of these features. |
| HR-DES | R. M. Hare gives a long argument (ending on p. 484) that "I should desist" from harming someone (given certain assumptions). Carefully explain this argument. What features of morality are appealed to in this argument? |
| HR-CAPP | Discuss the question of the morality of capital punishment from the perspective of a universal prescriptivist. |
| HR-ROUT | R. M. Hare claims to have "arrived at what is essentially a utilitarian answer to our moral problem; and we have arrived at it by a Kantian route." What does he mean? In what sense is his answer utilitarian? In what sense is his route Kantian? |
| HR-UTIL | How does R. M. Hare's utilitarianism differ (according to him) from standard act utilitarianism? What does he introduce to avoid the objections to standard act utilitarianism? Does his version of utilitarianism avoid those objections? |
| HR-LEVL | What are the two "levels" of moral thinking that Hare distinguishes? What are the differences between them? How does distinguishing these levels avoid some problems that other moral theories encounter? Explain. |
| HR-FEAT | Explain the "two logical features" of the word "ought" R. M. thinks are central to understanding moral argument. Explain how on Hare's view moral argument can take place, given these features. |
| HR-LEVL | Explain the "two levels" of moral thinking identified by R. M. Hare. What is the function of each level? How does appeal to these two levels help Hare avoid what would otherwise be objections to his theory? Critically discuss. |
| R-KIN | Explain what "kin selection" is and how sociobiologists tie it to morality? Critically discuss. |
| GW-ELE | What, according to Alan Gewirth, are the elements in the analysis of rights? What, according to Gewirth, are human rights? Critically discuss. |
| GW-PRI | Gewirth considers several "prior attempts at justification" of the existence of human rights. Explain two of these attempts and Gewirth's rejection of them. Critically discuss. |
| GW-ARG | Alan Gewirth argues that rational agents are committed to principle of acting in accordance with the rights to freedom and well-being had by all prospective purposive agents. Explain the argument Gewirth offers for this conclusion. Critically discuss the argument. |
| GW-4-5 | Gewirth takes some pains in his argument to defend his inference from "I must have freedom and well-being" to "I have rights to freedom and well-being." Explain and critically discuss his defense of this inference. |
| GW-13 | Gewirth argues that "by virtue of accepting ["I have rights to freedom and well-being because I am a prospective purposive agent"], the agent must also accept ... "All prospective purposive agents have rights to freedom and well-being." Explain this move in Gewirth's argument. Is Gewirth right about this? Critically discuss. |
| G-THE | David Gauthier considers the claim that "Morality is a system of principles such that it is advantageous for everyone if everyone accepts and acts on it, yet acting on the system of principles requires that some persons perform disadvantageous acts." Give an example of a system of this sort, i.e., of the sort this thesis says morality is, (and show that it is of this sort), if it is possible for there to be one. If it is not possible for there to be a system of this sort, argue that it is not possible. Finally, is morality a system of this sort, i.e., is the claim that Gauthier considers true? Critically discuss. |
| G-PD | Carefully explain the "Prisoners' Dilemma." What, if anything does this have to do with morality? In what way can the prisoners' dilemma be treated as a critique of a purely egoist account of practical reasons? Critically discuss. |
| G-PBT | What does Gauthier mean by the "prudent but trustworthy man?" Does such a person differ from someone who is prudent? If so, how? Does such a person differ from someone who is trustworthy? If so, how? Does such a person differ from someone who is moral? If so, how? Explain (in all cases). |
| H-INNR | What does Gilbert Harman (in "Moral Relativism Defended") mean by "inner judgments?" What does he think the "logical form" of such judgments is? What does Harman think is true of all inner judgments? Are all moral judgments inner judgments in Harman's sense? If not, explain why some moral judgments are not. If all are inner judgments, give examples of moral judgments Harman thinks not to be inner judgments and explain how they really are. Critically discuss. |
| H-PUZZ | In "Moral Relativism Defended" Harman writes "I will argue ... that this hypothesis accounts for an otherwise puzzling aspect of our moral views that, as far as I know, there is no other way to account for." What hypothesis is he referring to? What is the "puzzling aspect" that he is referring to? How (according to Harman) does the hypothesis account for this puzzling aspect? Explain. Does his hypothesis account for it? Is there any other way to account for it? Critically discuss. |
| H-AGRE | What does Gilbert Harman (in "Moral Relativism Defended") mean by an "agreement?" What, according to Harman, do agreements (in this sense) have to do with morality? Explain at least two objections that have been brought against implicit agreement theories and explain how Harman's theory (in his view) avoids these objections. Critically discuss. |
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| SC-MAT | Scanlon compares several views that might be held about the nature of mathematics with views that might be held about the nature of morality. Explain these views. Which view seems most plausible? Why? Critically discuss. |
| SC-UTI | What does Scanlon mean by "Philosophical Utilitarianism?" How does it differ from normative utilitarianism? What is the relation between these views? Does Scanlon accept philosophical utilitarianism? Critically discuss philosophical utilitarianism. |
| SC-CON | Explain in detail Scanlon's example of a contractualist account of the nature of moral wrongness which he states at the begining of part II. Give examples of how this view would determine some action to be wrong. Critically discuss. |
| SC-MOT | Scanlon thinks that his account of contractualism provides "an extremely plausible account of moral motivation." What account of moral motivation does contractualism provide in his view? Is this plausible? Critically discuss. |
| O-JUST | Can morality be rationally justified? If so, how? If not, why not? Critically discuss. |