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Philosophical Topics

Volume 22 No. 1 & 2, Spring & Fall 1994
The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett
Issue editor: Christopher Hill
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1.Content Meets Consciousness Lynne Rudder Baker1
2.What Is Dennett’s Theory a Theory of? Ned Block23
3.Differences that Make No Difference Fred Dretske41
4.Our Knowledge of the Internal World Ivan Fox59
5.Out of the Closet: A Qualophile Confronts Qualophobia Joseph Levine107
6.Qualia! (Now Showing at a Theater near You) Eric Lormand127
7.In Defense of the Knowledge Argument Jeff McConnell157
8.Dennett’s Logical Behaviorism Brian P. McLaughlin &
John O’Leary-Hawthorne
189
9.Dennett’s Unrealistic Psychology Georges Rey259
10.What Isn’t a Belief? Mark Richard291
11.First-Person Operationalism and Mental Taxonomy David M. Rosenthal319
12.The Personal Stance Carol Rovane351
13.The Problem of Moral Luck Michael Slote397
14.Interior Colors Joseph Thomas Tolliver411
15.Dennett, Drafts, and Phenomenal Realism Robert Van Gulick443
16.Witnessed Behavior and Dennett’s Intentional Stance Stephen Webb457
17.Color and Notional Content Stephen L. White471
18.Get Real Daniel Dennett505
I.Scale Up in the Fox Islands Thorofare:
Reply to Fox
Daniel Dennett506
II.Dretske’s Blind Spot:
Reply to Dretske
Daniel Dennett511
III.Truth-Makers, Cow-sharks, and lecterns:
Reply to McLaughlin and O’Leary-Hawthorne, Richard, Baker, and Webb
Daniel Dennett517
IV.Superficialism versus Hysterical Realism:
Reply to Rey
Daniel Dennett530
V.Otto and the Zombies:
Reply to Levine and Van Gulick
Daniel Dennett537
VI.Higher-order thoughts and mental Blocks:
Reply to Rosenthal and Block
Daniel Dennett543
VII.Qualia refuse to go quietly:
Reply to Tolliver, White, McConnell, and Lormand
Daniel Dennett551
VIII.Luck, regret, and kinds of persons:
Reply to Slote and Rovane
Daniel Dennett558

Richard Lee, rlee@comp.uark.edu, last modified: 20 August 1998