Dodson,
C.S. & Schacter, D.L. (2001). "If I had said it I would have remembered
it": Reducing false memories with a distinctiveness heuristic. Psychonomic
Bulletin & Review, 8, 155-161.
This study deals with the production of false
memories in the DRM paradigm and the use of a distinctiveness heuristic
to prevent the production of false memories. The main idea behind
the distinctiveness heuristic is that if your memory for targets
is especially distinctive you should be less likely to accept false memories
because the false memories will seem relatively sparse by comparison.
Schacter's conducted a couple previous studies
looking at the distinctiveness heuristic. In these studies he and
his colleagues found lower rates of false memories when items are presented
as pictures than when items are presented as words (Israel
& Schacter, 1997; Schacter,
Israel & Racine, 1999). If one assumes that pictures result
in more distinctive memories than words then you can account for these
findings by means of the distinctiveness heuristic.
The basic purpose of the present research is to
show that the distinctiveness pattern generalizes beyond the picture/word
distinction. This is important because its always possible that some
other characteristic of pictures is what produces the effect not their
memorial distinctiveness per se.
The manipulation that they decided to use was
to compare cases in which the subjects say the target words out loud during
study with cases in which they heard the words.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants were visually presented with sixteen
DRM lists at a rate of one word every 1.5 seconds.
-
In the hear condition subjects also heard
the word 400 msec after the onset of the visual presentation.
-
In the say condition subjects read the words
out loud as they were being presented
Immediately after the study phase subjects took a
recognition memory test. The test was pretty standard for this kind
of research. It included:
-
Targets: Items that had actually been presented
at study
-
False Targets: The non-presented word to which
the study items were related (i.e. critical lures)
-
Target Controls: Targets from non-presented
lists (i.e. distractors)
-
False Target Controls: Critical lures from
non-presented lists. (i.e. distractor lures)
Results
|
Targets |
Target Controls |
False Targets |
False Target Controls |
| Hear |
.71
|
.16
|
.72
|
.29
|
| Say |
.76
|
.16
|
.51
|
.28
|
If you look at the uncorrected recognition data it
looks like there are many fewer false memories (i.e. selection of false
targets) for subjects in the Say condition than for those in the
Hear condition.
| A' |
Target vs. Target Control |
Target vs. False Target |
False Target vs False Target Control |
| Hear |
.84 |
.50 |
.77 |
| Say |
.86 |
.69 |
.66 |
They also conducted analyses using A' as a measure
of memory sensitivity. A' can vary between 0 and 1 with values of
.50 indicating zero sensitivity (e.g. equal rates hits and false alarms).
They make three signal detection comparisons.
-
Target vs. Target Control: This is just the
traditional comparison between hits and false alarms. It provides
an indication of how much more common it was for subjects to select targets
than for subjects to select completely unrelated lures. Note that
sensitivity here is well above chance and that there is no significant
difference between the Hear and Say conditions.
-
Target vs. False Target: This one compares
memory for targets and critical lures. In the Hear condition
A' = .50. This indicates that subjects are just as likely to select
critical lures as they are targets (Go back to table 1 and you'll see that's
true). In the Say condition A' = .69. This indicates
that subjects were somewhat more likely to select targets than critical
lures.
-
False Targets vs. False Targets Controls:
This one compares recognition of critical lures with recognition of critical
lures from non-presented lists. In both conditions A' is significantly
greater than chance (i.e. .50). This indicates that selection of
the critical lures isn't just a function of random guessing. The
A' score for the Hear condition was greater than the A' score for
the Say condition.
The conclusion from both methods of doing the analysis
is that subjects who said the words rather than just hearing the words
were less likely to falsely recognize the critical lures.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2 they repeated the basic design but
this time did it within subjects. In their previous picture false
memory research they found that the distinctiveness heuristic did
not seem to operate when the same subject was presented with some lists
made up of pictures and some lists made up of words (Schacter,
Israel & Racine, 1999). The authors argue that within subject designs
make it difficult for subjects to implement the distinctiveness heuristic
because it is no longer the case that targets as a class are distinctive.
So in this experiment subjects were presented
with some lists where they heard the words and some lists where they were
asked to read the words.
|
Targets |
Target Controls |
False Targets |
False Target Controls |
| Hear |
.70
|
.12
|
.57
|
.14
|
| Say |
.79
|
.12
|
.58
|
.14
|
| A' |
Target vs. Target Control |
Target vs. False Target |
False Target vs False Target Control |
| Hear |
.86 |
.62 |
.76 |
| Say |
.88 |
.68 |
.77 |
Its quite clear in these results that there is no
longer a difference in the rate of false memories for the Hear
and Say conditions. So these results are in agreement with
what the authors predicted.
General Discussion
One of the important issues they discuss in their
general discussion is the distinction (pun intended) between a false memory
supression mechanism that is general and one that is list specific.
They argue that the supression mechanism is not list specific.
This is interesting because a number of possible
false memory supression mechanisms have recently been proposed (this diverges
a little from Dodson's discussion, but its worth pursuing):
-
Distinctiveness Heuristic: Expectations about
the likely distinctiveness of items leads to rejection of false memories
when distintiveness expectations are high (Israel
& Schacter, 1997; Schacter,
Israel & Racine, 1999).
-
Recollection Rejection (Recall to Reject):
Conscious recollection of target leads to the rejection of related lures
(I know I didn't have a hotdog at the game because I remember having pizza
at the game). (Brainerd, et. al, in press; Brainerd, et. al, 1995; Rotello,
et. al, 2000; Rotello
& Heit, 2000; 1999)
-
Production Recollection: I know the critical
lure wasn't presented because I remember generating the critical lure at
time of study (Bredart,
2000)
There are others too that haven't to my knowledge
been formally proposed. For instance, subjects have sometimes told
us they were sure an item wasn't presented because they were anticipating
its presentation and it never happened.
So an interesting direction for false memory research
right now has been to understand not just the mechanism through which false
memories are produced but also the mechanisms through which they are suppressed.
The authors also take up the issue of whether
a pure similarity account could explain their data. They argue that
it would be difficult for a pure familiarity account to explain why the
distinctiveness pattern disappears in the within subjects manipulation.