Roebers, C.M. & McConkey, K.M. (2003). Mental reinstatement of the misinformation context and the misinformation effect in children and adults. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 17, 477-493.

 

This is a paper about the misinformation effect.  In the misinformation effect people witness and event and then are presented with either misleading or neutral information (in some experiments there’s a third condition where people get consistent information).  On later memory tests misleading information tends to reduce accuracy.

 

People have tried to explain the misinformation effect in a bunch of ways. For instance, Loftus provided a storage based account where the suggested information ‘destructively updates’ memory.  McCloskey and Zaragoza argued that the misinformation effect happens when people can’t remember the correct answer but reason that the experimenter must know what happened, and so they deliberately go along with the experimenter.  Lindsay explained the misinformation effect as being due to a source monitoring error.  According to fuzzy trace theory the misinformation effect can occur either due to gist or verbatim memory for the misinformation.  Anyway, lots of possibilities.

 

The authors attempt to understand the misinformation effect in terms of an associative network model that Ayers and Reder came up with.  Here’s the idea, when people encode an event it gets represented in an associative network where the details of the event, including contextual details get represented.  When people are presented with misleading information the misleading information and the context in which the misleading information were encoded gets integrated with the original event representation.  Importantly, at time of test, when concepts get activated, people don’t become consciously aware of the source of the activation.  All this leads the authors to predict that reinstating the context of the postevent session should increase the size of the misinformation effect.  Pretty counterintuitive if you ask me, let’s see how it turns out.

 

Methods

 

Five year olds, seven year olds and adults watched a brief film.  One week later they received a misleading interview that included some misleading questions about central details, some misleading questions about peripheral details, and a few filler questions.  Finally one week later they took a two alternative forced choice recognition test.  Before taking the test they were either asked to mentally reinstate the context of the earlier interview or they were not.  No robot monkeys were harmed in this experiment. 

 

Results

 

There was a strong age effect on the acquiescence to misleading information during the first interview.  Children were much more likely to incorrectly accept the suggestions in those interviews.

 

On the final forced choice recognition test, children were less accurate than adults.  Overall, reinstatement of context decreased accuracy for the adults but not for the children.  The effect of reinstatement of context appeared to be limited to the peripheral questions, and when peripheral questions are looked at reinstatement of context had an effect on both 7 year olds and adults.

 

Discussion

 

Reinstating the context of the postevent questions decreased how accurate adults and 7-year olds were with regard to peripheral information.  Reinstatement of context did not have the same effect on the youngest children.

 

Here’s what the authors think is going on: When people witnessed the original event it got represented in an associative network.  When people were asked the misleading questions, the misleading information, as well as the context in which that misleading information was presented, became integrated with the network representing the original event.  When the misinformation context was reinstatement, activation spread to the misleading information.  Because people don’t have conscious access to the cause of the activation (i.e. that it was from misleading information) they incorrectly accepted the items that had been previously suggested.  The authors suggest that the age differences might be because as kids get older they’re able to build bigger, more interconnected networks, with stronger associations between the elements.

 

Another interesting finding was that kids were more likely to yield to questions during the postevent interview, but then to change their answer to the correct one at the time of the final test.


 

University of Arkansas

Department of Psychology

Graduate Program in Experimental Psychology

Lampinen Lab

False Memory Reading Group

False Memory Reading Group Fall 2003