Introduction to Philosophy: Overhead

Introduction to Philosophy	Notes	*This is not a substitute for coming to class - or for reading* the material.**	Richard Lee
Philosophy 2003	Notes	Copyright © 2006, Richard Lee	Autumn 2006

Another Argument from Introspection
Against the Identity Theory

1. My mental states are introspectively known by me as states of my conscious self.
2. My brain states are not introspectively known by me as states of my conscious self.
3. My mental states are not identical with my brain states (1, 2 Leibniz's Law)

(Churchland P p.258b)

Richard Lee, rlee@uark.edu, last modified: 11 April 2003

	1.	My mental states are introspectively known by me as states of my conscious self.
	2.	My brain states are not introspectively known by me as states of my conscious self.
	3.	My mental states are not identical with my brain states (1, 2 Leibniz's Law)