| Introduction to Philosophy | Notes | This is not a substitute for coming to class - or for reading the material. | Richard Lee |
| Philosophy 2003 C 001 | Copyright © 2002, Richard Lee | Autumn 2002 | |
Hylas distinguishes "sound as it is perceived by us" (sensation-sound) from sound "as it is in itself" (real-sound) (P 167a)
sensation-sound we immediately perceive (P 167a); it is a "particular kind of sensation" (P 167a).Notice how this distinction would allow Hylas to address the famous question, "If a tree falls in a forest and no one hears it, would it make a sound?"real-sound exists "without us" (i.e., in the eternal world); it is "merely a vibrative or undulatory motion in the air." (P 167a)
Philonous points out that "according to you [Hylas], real sounds may possibly be seen or felt [since they are motions], but never heard." (P 167b)
This seems absurd, and before long Hylas admits "I had as well grant that sounds, too, have no real being without the mind." (P 168a)