Significance of the Project

In general, most of the currently available studies in the history of rhetoric place their emphasis upon the development of the art in western culture. Studies if rhetoric customarily consider its beginnings in ancient Greece, its development in the classical doctrines of Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian, and then trace these influences upon subsequent theories current in Western Europe, Britain and American.

So far as this author knows, however, no attempt has been made to describe what practices of public speaking were followed in early Jewish culture, or what theories of rhetoric, if any, were developed by that culture. And yet, that culture is at least as old as the Greek and Roman cultures; it shows unbroken continuity from earliest times to the present day, and in addition, is generally regarded as having had an important influence upon Western thought. the significance of this study, then, is that it represents a preliminary examination of Jewish sources in an attempt to ascertain what rhetorical theory and practice may have been developed in the Academies of this early Jewish culture. It is, thus, the hope of this author that this study may open a whole new field for further examination by students of rhetoric.

Materials

In attempting to describe and analyze the rhetorical practices of the Babylonian Academies, the writer has relied primarily upon the English translation of the Babylonian Talmud. This Talmud is the whole Talmud and consists of Mishnah, the Oral Law redacted in the Palestinian Academies, and Gemara, the commentary which was redacted in the Babylonian schools. It is also differentiated from the Palestinian Talmud, which was an abbreviated version used in the Palestinian Academies, and from the midrash, which was a collection of homilies and sermons.

The Talmud is one of the most important works in the Jewish culture, and even today provides the core of religious education for many Jews. According to a leading historian:

The Talmud forms a turning point in Jewish history, and...constitutes an essential factor therein... It is of less consequence what the Talmud is in itself, than was its influence on history, that is to say on the succeeding generations, whose education it chiefly controlled.

According to Louis Finklestein;

It is impossible to understand Judaism without an appreciation of the place it assigns to the study and practice of Talmudic law. therefore, to this day, he [the Jew] must devote considerable time not merely to the mastery of Talmud, but also to training in its method of reasoning. The study of Bible and Talmud...is itself a means of communion with God.

The Babylonian Talmud was selected as a primary source for this project since it is considered authoritative wherever it differs with any other contemporary source, and it is a complete collection of the work done in this area. The Soncino English translation is used since it is considered a highly reliable translation and valid for research in areas other than religious minutiae.

The Talmud, itself, is a valid source for this project, since it is representative of the literature of the period. It is likely, therefore, that it provides a clear picture of the process of education at the Academies in which it was redacted. The Talmud, in the standard Hebrew-Aramaic editions, consists of twelve folio volumes, totaling nearly ten thousand pages. The English translation consists of thirty-five volumes (19,457 quarto pages) of text and commentary. All of these editions carry a standard pagination, so that references may be carried either to the Hebrew or English editions.

Because of the special nature of this work, certain peculiarities in style will be observed throughout:

1. All footnotes to Talmudic tracts will cite the folio page number and the reference to the English translation. The number appearing first is the folio page, while the second number refers to the Soncino translation. In cases where Mishnah alone appears, the reference will be to the chapter and paragraph of the Mishnah.

2. In Hebrew-English transliteration, the system used by the Soncino translation was employed. In direct quotations from other sources, the transliterations of the authors are used.

3. The frequently recurring abbreviation, "R," refers to "rabbi" and "B." means "son of." B.C.E. stand for, "Before the Common Era," and corresponds to the more popular "B.C." C.E. stands for "the Common Era," and corresponds to "A.D." This system was used since the bulk of the source materials use this method of abbreviation.

Methods

The method of research used by the author in this project was to examine the Babylonian Talmud to ascertain (1) whether it contains any advice to speakers which might be construed as a complete or a fragmentary theory of rhetoric, and (2) to determine whether the lectures, disputations and discussions recorded in the Talmud show any consistent patterns of organization, common forms of proof, or follow any discernible form from which one might infer an implicit theory of rhetoric.

Limitations

This study is limited, first, to a study of Academic speaking. There is ample evidence of a widespread use of forensic and homiletic oratory, but these are beyond the scope of this study.

A second limitation is that of time. This study is confined to the period generally agreed upon as that during which the Babylonian Talmud was redacted. Its opening date, 70 C.E., is the year when the Jewish Temple was destroyed and Judaism was forced to reorganize as an intellectual, rather than a sacrificial religion. 500 C.E. is generally regarded as the date when the talmud was complete, and no further material could be added.

A third limitation is geographical in that only the Babylonian and Palestinian Academies are to be studied. Actually this limitation is enforced by circumstances due to the fact that no other such academies are known to have existed during the time period of this study. Further, these Academies are generally recognized as forming a definable group and, therefore, can be studied as a unit.

The basic function of the Talmud was according to Cohen, "...to provide the Jewish people with a body of teaching, which should be more than a creed, but, also a guide of life in every phase. It created the world in which the Jew moved and had his being." This comprehensive nature of the Talmud presents great difficulties to the non-professional student. Solomon Schechter states three obstacles to study of Talmud:

1. The Jumble of material makes indexing virtually impossible. The groupings under subject matter are misleading on many occasions.

2. A great number of authorities, estimated at 500, appear in the Talmudic text.

3. The minute detail of the discussions complicates them for the student who is untrained in Judaism.

The mass of material in the Talmud is presented uncritically. The men who took part in the redaction of the Talmud were also the Talmudic authorities, whose opinions appear in Talmud. According to Bacher;

Although the Talmud is an academic product and may be characterized in the main as a report (frequently with the accuracy of minutes) of the discussions of the schools...neither teachers nor pupils stood aloof from that life, but took part in it as judges, instructors and expounders of the Law, caused the Talmud to represent even non-scholastic affairs with an abundance of minute details, and made it an important source for the history of civilization. Talmud discussed the most varied branches of human knowledge - astronomy and medicine, mathematics and law, anatomy and botany.

In order to extract any sort of uniform philosophy from Talmud, individual expressions of view must be compared with the actual customs followed by the group. The Talmud is not the work of one man, or even one school. It is the work of many differing authorities, covering a great span of time. The Talmud then is actuarially a report of development rather than a code of law, and any conclusions drawn concerning the Talmudic view on anything must bear this fact in mind.

In addition to the formal division of Talmud into Mishnah and Gemara, there is a further division according to type of material. the bulk of the material in the Talmud is halachah, which is defined as;

...a specific declaration of the Divine will applicable to a given case; and as such, it was binding on all who accepted the Torah as their supreme authority.

The imaginative material in the Talmud is called haggadah. These passages are designed for instruction in morality, and they are largely in the province of the synagogue. They are inserted in Talmud for the purpose of providing variety and making the subject matter more interesting to the listener.

The Talmud, then, represents the most significant production in the Jewish religion since the Bible. It is highly authoritative, and its contents present a good picture of conditions and practices in the academies under study. The practice and theory ascertained from a study of the Talmud is likely to be the common practice of the whole Jewish culture during this period.

Simeon b. Shetah is regarded as the founder of the elementary school system. During the reign of Queen Salome Alexandra (70 B.C.E. - 67 B.C.E.) he established charity schools throughout Judea, under the general supervision of the Scribes and the immediate direction of synagogue officials. Just before the destruction of the Temple the educational program was completed by Joshua b. Gamala, who set up a system of compulsory education including an elementary school and a rudimentary form of high school.

The bulk of the history of Jewish education in Talmudic days concerns itself with the history of the Talmudic Academies. Aside from the brief mention in the Talmud of Simeon b. Shetah and Joshua b. Gamala, there are few direct statements about the development of the Academies. The Talmud give some Idea of the extent of this education;

Did not R Phinehas state on the authority of R. Oshaia that there were three hundred and ninety four courts of law in Jerusalem, and an equal number of Synagogues, of Houses of study and of schools.

While probably an exaggeration, this passage illustrates the pride which the rabbis took in their school system.

The Talmud also describes the compulsory nature of education and fixes the responsibility for education by pointing out that if a father did not educate his son, he had the duty of turning his son over to a tutor. Fathers frequently failed their duty, however, and therefore compulsory schools were set up. Graetz feels that these schools later developed into the community elementary and high schools.

Although the first Academy is considered to be that of Johanan b. Zakkai, founded in 70 C.E., the Academies did not spring into existence suddenly. Some form of higher education existed during the pre-exilic period, since many of the early authorities cited in Talmud were educated at such institutions. The organized schools emerged from the periodic meetings held by the Scribes some time before the beginning of the Christian era. The schools were quite closely connected to the informal legislative bodies organized by the Pharisees during this period and the recurring phrase, "Great Assembly", probably refers to these predecessors of the academies.

According to a Midrashic legend, the first academy was founded by Johanan b. Zakkai in 70 C.E. He was the leader of the Pharisees in Jerusalem, and tiring of the war with Rome, he had his followers carry him out of the city in a coffin, and smuggle him to Jabneh where he opened his school. It is more likely that Johanan ben Zakkai reached some agreement with the Roman generals which gave him and his supporters permission to leave the city and establish their school.

The first problem confronting the founders of the new school was the re- organization of the religion. With the Temple destroyed, it was necessary to group the religion around another central core. This required that some legislative body decide on the many questions that arose, such as fixing of the calendar, regulation of ritual law and the role of the sacrifice. With the establishment of this legislative body at the academy, the beginnings of the aristocracy of education which was to arise, were made.

The Academy of Jabneh attempted to meet the needs of the time by educating a new generation of scholars, and by attempting to replace the former aristocracy of priesthood and landed nobility with an aristocracy based on the Pharisaic ideas of scholarship. This task was successfully accomplished at Jabneh. According to Moore;

What is certain is that at Jamnia under the lead of Johanan b. Zakkai in the years immediately following the destruction of Jerusalem, the work of conservation and adaptation was accomplished with such wisdom that Judaism was not only tided over the crisis but entered upon a period of progress which it may well count among the most notable chapters in its history.

The work begun by Johanan b. Zakkai was completed by Gamaliel II, who took over as head of Jabneh at the death of Johanan. Despite his authoritarian personality, Gamaliel managed to get the remnant of the Jews in Palestine to recognize this academy as the central authority in all political and religious matters. Several other academies had sprung up, and all of these were brought under the control of Jabneh.

After Gamaliel, the site of the main academy shifted several times. Despite continuing warfare and recurring persecutions, there was always at least one Academy in Palestine which maintained itself as the center of the religion. After an ill-fated revolt in 132 C.E., rabbinical synod was held at Usha, which led to the final redaction of the Mishnah. This was the work of R. Judah Ha-Nasi, known simply as Rabbi.

Up to the time of Rabbi, Babylon, which was by far the larger Jewish community, had remained subordinate to Palestine. With the intensification of Roman persecution after the death of Rabbi, the Babylonian Academies became the more important than the Palestinian. In Babylon the Jewish religion was not only tolerated, but was even allowed an autonomous government under the Babylonian rulers. This shift of authority from Babylon to Palestine represented a sort of continuum, for two pupils of Rabbi, Samuel and Rab, elevated the stature of the Academy in Babylon. The Babylonian Academies were organized on the same lines as the Palestinian. They had essentially the same heritage and were confronted with similar problems. Consequently, though the Talmudic Academies existed in two geographical areas, they shared a common development, and represent one complete unit.

With the elevation of the Babylonian Academies to first rank, the educational system of the Jewish culture became as universal as any that had existed until then in the World. While there were still many illiterates, the bulk of the community had some education, and, at any event, they recognized the leadership of the scholars who headed the community.

Draizin holds that these age limits were generally followed and only upon completion of this study, or its equivalent, was a student allowed to enter the Academy. Because of the lack of central control, however, depending on the community the child would begin his schooling anywhere from three to six, and move on to the next level after he had completed the subject matter of the preceding level. Another Talmudic dictum allows leeway in starting ages;

Do not accept a pupil under the age of six; a pupil of the age of six, you shall accept and stuff him like an ox...Nurse told me that a child of six is ripe for Scripture; one of ten for Mishnah...

Apparently, the actual divisions in the curricula were the elementary school which dealt with mikra, or the simple reading of the Bible; the high school, which taught Mishnah and the Academy which dealt with Talmud and mastery of subject, rather than age was the criterion of promotion.

Respect for the teacher was a keynote of the whole Talmudic educational system. However, the respect existed in varying degrees, and there was a sharp distinction between the privileges accorded a teacher at the Academy, and the lesser figure, the teacher at the elementary school. In order to qualify as an elementary school teacher, a man had to be married and over forty. Women were not eligible to serve as teachers. The teacher was allowed to have an assistant if he had more than forty pupils and two assistants if there were more than fifty. Non-Jews were not allowed to serve as teachers. Teachers could be suspended for maltreating their students, and both the parents and officials of the Academy had the right to examine the elementary teacher's ability at any time.

The Bible was the sole subject of study in the elementary school. Training in the Bible consisted of learning of the Hebrew text and not with the meaning of the text. The reading that was taught was complicated by the fact that Hebrew was no longer the language of everyday speech. The text of the Bible had no vowels, and the children were required to commit to memory the traditional pronunciation of the entire Bible. Writing was prohibited since all writing was done by the community Scribes, and the art was handed down in guild fashion. The elementary school also taught the child how to participate in the synagogue service. No secular subjects were taught in the elementary schools.

Sessions were held in the schools from morning to evening from ten to twelve hours without a break. The children were excused on Friday afternoon, and on the days before holidays. special sessions were held on the Sabbath and on holidays, so that parents could visit the schools and hear the children recite. Children were also obligated to attend the daily synagogue services. In addition, the father of the child had the responsibility of teaching him a trade or craft, and this instruction usually took place after regular school hours.

The pedagogical base of the whole elementary school system was training of the memory. All of the material taught had to be retained in the memory of the student. This compelled the teachers to base their teaching on a system of memory jogs. In teaching the alphabet, for example, the students were taught to use the shapes of the Hebrew letters as mnemonic aids. One particularly characteristic Talmud passage describes an exhibition lesson one of the elementary schools;

The rabbis told R. Joshua b. Levi: Children have come to the Beth Hamidrash and said things the like of which was not said even in the days of Joshua the son of Nun. Thus: Alef Beth means 'learn wisdom' [alef binah]; Gimmel Daleth, 'show kindness to the poor' [Gemol Dallia]. Why is the foot of the Gimmel stretched toward the Daleth? Because it is fitting for the benevolent to run after [seek out] the poor. And why is the top of the Daleth stretched out toward the Gimmel? Because he [the poor] must make himself available to him. And why is the face of the Daleth turned away from the Gimmel? Because he must give him help in secret, lest he be ashamed of him. He Waw That is the name of the Holy One, Blessed be He [These letters in combination form the Tetragrammaton, which is the unpronounceable name of God.] Zayyin, Heth, Yod, Kaf, Lamed, this sequence teaches that if thou doest [Zan] thee, be gracious [Hen]unto thee, show goodness [meTib] to thee, give thee a heritage [Yerushah], and bind a crown [Kether] on thee in the world to come [oLam habah]. The open Mem and the closed Mem denote open teaching [Ma'amar] and esoteric teaching. the bent Nun and the straight Nun: the faithful [Ne'eman] if humble, will ultimately be the faithful, straightened. Samek, Ayyin: support [Semok] the poor [Aniyyim]. Another interpretation: devise [Aseh] mnemonics [Simanim] in the Torah and thus memorize it. The bent Pe intimate an open mouth [peh] and a closed mouth. A bent Zadde and a straight Zadde: the righteous [Zaddik] is bent in the world: the righteous is straightened in the next world... Kuf stands for holy [Kadosh]; Resh for wicked [rasha]. Why is the face of the Kuf averted from the Resh? The Holy One, Blessed be He said: I cannot look at the wicked. And why is the crown of the Kuf turned toward the Resh? The Holy One, Blessed be He, saith: If he repents, I will bind a crown on him like Mine... SHIN stands for falsehood [SHeker]; Taw for truth [emeTH...

The object of the elementary training was to transmit the whole Bible without any attempt to understand it. Therefore, mnemonics were used, and usually the memorization was based on "...mechanical associations, arbitrary, ingenious aids...endless repetitions." Where understanding was important, learning took place through observation or participation, like the learning of the rules pertaining to holiday observances and the Sabbath. These were learned by actual participation in the synagogue service and observation of the ritual. The child learned the entire liturgy, ritual and daily observance through this method. Because of the necessity of teaching religious observances to children, many of the holiday observances were geared specifically to do this. The Passover ritual, for example, was designed to answer the questions of children arising from their observation of the ritual. The liturgy was taught by association between the chants learned in the elementary school and the chants in the synagogue. The weekly Bible portion which was read in the synagogue coincided with the portion taught in the school. According to Morris, "...the history of education knows no parallel to this collective feat of memory."

There is some conflict in the philosophy of elementary pedagogy. One Talmudic disputation concerns the relative merits of the elementary teacher who encourages through rewards as opposed to the one who forces through threat, but no conclusion is reached. This is one of the few places in Talmud where education is actually discussed.

This elementary education provided the basis for all further education. The same process was carried on in the High School with Mishnah. By the time the student reached the high school, he was about thirteen, and therefore had the obligation of manhood as far as religious observance was concerned. Consequently, when and if he reached the Academy, he had committed to memory the entire Scripture and Oral Law. He had a thorough knowledge of the ritual and liturgy of his faith. He was then ready to begin the work of understanding and interpreting the material he knew so well.

This broad definition of Torah or Law as consisting of both the Oral and Written Law was specifically stated in Talmud and became, for the Orthodox Jew, an article of faith. The relations between the Oral and Written Law is described by Moore;

Between the written and the unwritten Law there could be no conflict. It was one of the principal works of the schools to exhibit and establish the complete accord between Scripture and Tradition; not as though the authority of the unwritten law as such depended on the written, but because the agreement was a criterion of the soundness of the particular tradition or interpretation.

Talmud attributes great antiquity to this process of learning the Oral and Written Law. Abraham is designated as the first to teach this, and the description of his method is similar to a description of the method of instruction in the Academy.

The underlying philosophy of education was clear cut. Study was encouraged because study was the highest religious precept. The actual motive of the student is immaterial, according to the Talmud, since study, regardless of the original motive will lead to study for its own sake. Study of precepts was regarded as superior even to practice of precepts since it was felt that practice could not come about without study, and, "...Study is greater for it leads to action." This emphasis on study kept the religion alive during periods of persecution. When observances were prohibited, the Rabbis held that study of the observances would be a valid substitute.

The precept of study was a universal obligation. No man was exempt from the obligation of study. It is likely, however, that this universal obligation was not universally observed. Through most Jews were probably familiar with Bible and had some knowledge of Mishnah, only a few of them ever attended the Academy. Certainly, the frequent mention of am-haarez, in the Talmud, referring to the non- observer, indicates that there were many people who did not fulfill the religious obligation.

In order to encourage study, therapeutic powers were attributed to it. One of the rabbinic clans, the House of Eli, had exceedingly short lives. It was pointed out that if they had studied harder, they would have lived longer. The Rabbis, generally, felt that study would lengthen life, and that death could not come to a man while he was engaged in study. Further, study was an essential element of life, and salvation could not be achieved by the man who did not study. The element of study in salvation appears to outclass all other elements. One passage states;

Raba said; When a man is led in for judgment he is asked, Did you deal faithfully, did you fix time for learning, did you engage in procreation, did you hope for salvation, did you engage in the dialectics of wisdom, did you understand one thing from another?

Another story tells of how R. Hisda struggled with the Angel of Death, and kept him away from his family by continuing to study. When he fell asleep, he was seized. Elsewhere, study is compared to an "elixir of life" while lack of study is called a "deadly poison." A more practical reward is given to the student, for he is told that when he finishes studying Mishnah, he is rewarded with Gemara. An inducement for everyone to study was the idea that if man studied only one day out of the year, the Scripture proves that it is considered that he studied all year.

With the great importance of study firmly fixed, the teacher at the Academy occupied a high place in the Talmudic Educational system. One passage states that the teacher will, "...be privileged to sit in the Heavenly Academy." The person who teaches the illiterate will be so powerful, that God will annul His decrees for him. Since no one was allowed to take a fee for teaching, it was felt that God would make miraculous provision for the teacher.

Study and learning were highly regarded by the Rabbi. Study was an all- pervasive element in their lives. They felt the obligation to study while young and old; age was not an excuse for ending study. The Talmud states that, "...one may meditate on learning everywhere, except at the baths or in a privy." Even though the precept of study is not mentioned in the Bible, through interpretations, the Rabbis elevated it over many of the Biblical precepts. One Rabbi presented proof that study superseded the daily offering at the Temple. Even the rebuilding of the Temple took second place to study, and the Rabbis were told that study takes precedence over the precept of honoring father and mother. Study is held to be equal to the practice of charity and peace-making. A Talmudic proverb indicated that the man who studied had everything in the world. A basic ethical passage indicates that the only good man is the man who studies constantly, and all evil results from failure to study.

Philosophically, then, education was the most important element in life according to the Rabbis. Since they held that study and learning were important for everyone they attempted to disperse learning throughout all the people. The existence of the elementary education system indicates that they succeeded in spreading literacy to some extent. The higher education of the Academy was restricted, however, since it required intense dedication on the part of the student.

An elaborate ceremony took place when rabbis were ordained. Ordination was decreed by the Nasi, sustained by a vote of the members of the Academy. There were different levels of ordination, which gave the rabbi different privileges in judgment. The lowest level conferred the right to decide religious questions; the second to decide both religious and civil questions; the third, religious civil and criminal questions; the fourth gave privilege in all questions, plus the honorary right to inspect firstlings and sacrifices if the Temple was ever rebuilt. There appeared to be no formal requirements for the selection of candidates for ordination. When the Nasi, or another member of the Academy felt that a student was worthy, he could be nominated for ordination and the members would either approve or reject the decree of the Nasi. The rabbi receiving ordination was put through the ritual of laying on of hands, which dated back to the anointment of Joshua as successor to Moses. The laying on of hands was sometimes accompanied by a chanting of the virtues of the candidate by the members. In some cases the newly ordained rabbi was asked to defend a difficult point in a disputation.

There were a number of minor rules of etiquette that had to be observed. The students were told never to expectorate in front of their teacher. They were also not allowed to sit in front of their teacher unless they were given permission. I was considered a gross insult to the teacher if the student remained outside the Academy while a lecture was in progress. Students were expected to visit their teachers after the sessions on festival days, and frequently were asked to recite before their teachers on these occasions. Despite some trivial rules, the respect which existed between teacher and student was genuine. Modesty and politeness were virtues which were encouraged in students and teachers. Students and teachers were both admonished to listen politely and respect each other's ideas. To punish violations of the accepted code of ethics or protocol, the Academies had the power to expel a student, which they used on rare occasions.

Many different pedagogical devices were used by the teachers at the Academies. One authority describes the method of instruction as, "...a protracted conversation into which the Rabbis decoyed their disciples, and from which they...profited as much as the latter." According to Goldin there was general agreement among the rabbis that the teaching methods used by Hillel should be used. This method followed a pattern of lecture followed by question, discussion and debate, with the order frequently becoming jumbled. The teaching methods of Hillel were based on the ideas that though fame was not the end of study, a man should be proud of his learning; that study is an essential element of life and cannot be postponed or abandoned; and that study must serve a moral end and should not be used for the personal advancement of the student.

The teachers in the Academies felt that they had Divine sanction for their teaching, based on the Divine revelation of Moses.

Moses received the Torah at Sinai and transmitted it to Joshua; Joshua to the Elders to the Prophets, and the Prophets to the Men of the Great Assembly. The latter used to say three things: Be patient in the administration of Justice, rear many disciples and make a fence around the Torah. They felt that the whole law had been revealed to Moses, but because of human frailty, much of it was lost. The means of recovering the lost laws were in the hands of the rabbis. Therefore, their responsibility in education was threefold; to be careful in justice, since the law might not be exactly correct; to obtain many pupils, for the more pupils the more likely that the laws would be restored; and to make each law that they had just a little more strict to prevent even an unconscious violation. Independent study was vigorously condemned for it was feared that the student who studied alone might fall into error. The student had the right to select his own teacher, and he was told that if one man's methods did not appeal to him, he was to attend another Academy until he found someone whose teaching he respected. By the same token, the teacher was admonished to send away the student that he could not help. In addition, since the students had to learn by memory, exactly as in the lower schools, the authorities insisted on regular attendance and much repetition. The idea of repetition combined with regularity was a basic concept of the educational philosophy. Since a student could not study alone, the students were advised to study in groups; to repeat halachoth and to discuss them. There was a special merit given to this group study.

There is some evidence that students were tested. Some of the rabbis held special sessions prior to the public sessions of the Academy and quizzed their students. Others authorities tested their students orally, and without warning.

Although corporal punishment was widely used in the lower schools, the method of encouragement was widely used in the Academy. One authority said, "If you see a student who finds his studies hard as iron, it is because his teacher does not encourage him." Some authorities made it a practice to declare a festive day when a student had finished a tractate.

Despite some modern ideas, there was a great deal of superstition attached to education in the Academy. One passage describes what foods can be eaten, tells the students to avoid passing under a camel, and advises them to beware of women. By and large, however, the education at the Academy followed a fairly modern format. It was based on lecture and discussion, and this coupled with the lack of books made it an excellent place for the exercise of speaking skills.

Qualifications for admission were not based on social status. It was presumed that the children of rabbis would be better trained in ritual and basic knowledge than others, and they were not as rigidly examined. In general, however, the Academies admitted anyone who could meet the basic qualifications, regardless of economic or social status.

The student was expected to be of high moral character. He had to be willing to declare his own animals unclean, if they were unclean. This would indicate a high degree of objectivity, since scholars generally lived in great poverty. The scholar was expected to be meek in the presence of other scholars, and display sufficient pride in the presence of the community in order to give weight to his decisions. The Academy in general, and his instructor in particular, were responsible for the behavior of the student in and out of the Academy. they felt that any misdeed on the part of the scholar was reflected on the Academy, and the rabbis took great care to maintain their good reputations.

The scholar had many privileges in the community because of his learning and because of the high regard in which learning was held. It was generally felt that a scholar was superior to a king of Israel, since kings ere hereditary, while if a scholar died, he could not be replaced. Some authorities felt that the scholar should be ranked next to God. In the event that a scholar was captured and put up for ransom, the community had the obligation of ransoming him, and the scholar took precedence over any relative, including father or mother. The Mishnah states, "...In captivity for ransom...the learned bastard takes precedence over the ignorant high priest." This respect had practical aspects as well. Any citizen who publicly insulted a scholar was subject to excommunication, nor could the scholar be publicly reprimanded. the scholar had the right to collect priestly dues on behalf of any priestly family, since, because the Temple was no longer in existence, the scholar had more prestige than the priest. In business transactions, the scholar had the right to demand to be served first. The scholars served as judges in the community, and had full privilege in judgment. In court cases to which he was a party, he needed no corroborative witnesses for his testimony and he had the privilege of prompting witnesses about their testimony or using notes for his own testimony. The scholar was exempted from all oaths, in or out of court. The most important privilege of all was exemption from taxation. All taxes levied against the scholars were assumed by the community.

The community felt that it was a blessing for a woman to marry a scholar, and as a result, fathers in the community offered board and room for a specified period of time to the scholar in return for marrying their daughters. The scholar was not obligated to live with his wife and could leave home for "...two to three years" in order to further his study. Though scholars were told to earn a living through engaging in a trade, they were exempted from all non-paying community labor. The scholar also had the privilege of demanding the best food and drink when he was a guest in anyone's home.

In order to earn the privileges given him, the scholar had many obligations to the community. His major obligation was to continue his study all the days of his life. He was expected to be scrupulous in his religious observance, thereby setting a good example for the community. Further, certain vestigial ritual practices still existed which demanded the services of someone of a priestly family. These included inspection for leprosy, determining the tax for a first-born son, and inspection of foods for ritual cleanliness. Since the priests were no longer instructed in these things, the scholar served as guide to the priests, and actually decided these matters.

The scholar's major obligation was teaching. The scholar who did not teach was called, "...myrtle in the wilderness." He taught in community schools if he was not too far advanced or in the Academy if he was ordained. Scholars were not allowed to take fees for any service which they rendered to the community, including judging or teaching. It was also considered essential that the scholar marry and have children, since it was felt that the child of a scholar would be a scholar himself.

There is a great deal of advice given to scholars about their personal behavior. he was to be neatly dressed and avoid ignorant people. He was to be courteous to his colleagues. One leading authority told scholars to "...provoke the anger of a Syrian woman."

Generally, the scholar at the Academy did not live the kind of life normally expected of a student. he was the ruling force in his community and was expected to live up to the privileges accorded him.

The curricula of the Academies presupposed a thorough reading knowledge of the Bible and Mishnah on the part of the student. The lower schools provided mastery and memory of the subject matter while the Academy worked to provide understanding and application of this material. In the Academies, as in the elementary schools, the emphasis was on religious material. Other studies were considered extraneous and entered the curriculum only as they related to religious matters. One authority stated;

Kinnim [the ritual use of bird's nests in the sacrificial law of the Temple] and Pithethe Niddah [the calculation of periods of menstruation in women for religious purposes] are essential ordinances; The study of the revolutions of the heavenly bodies [astronomy] and arithmetic are aftercourses of wisdom. However, much of the more complex and archaic religious material was ignored in many of the Academies. Tohoroth and Kodashim were generally neglected, since the bulk of their material was only pertinent to the land of Palestine. Certain Academies studied these books on the premise that study about the Temple service was a valid substitute for the Temple service. One authority defended the teaching of these obsolete laws on the grounds that it was good mental exercise for the students. Since the curriculum was not formally established, some authorities felt that the students should be allowed to select what they wanted the teachers to teach. They held that allowing the student to follow his own inclination would make for better learning. The bulk of the authorities gave the student the right to select his teacher, but once he had selected a teacher, he was obligated to learn according to that teacher's system. All of the Academies taught some form of hermeneutics, dialectic, and disputation and other matters as they saw fit.

Subjects such as history, literature, art, and others which are common in a modern curriculum enter the Talmudic curriculum only as they relate to religious matters. Some training in grammar and spelling was essential to the comprehension of the Bible. Much of this training was given in the elementary school, but since the Talmud includes many debates about grammar and spelling, we can assume that these were not taught according to any universal plan. Spelling was a frequent topic for disputation. These were largely concerned with the use of the two silent letters, which caused a great deal of confusion in meaning.

The study of literature took the form of criticism and explanation of the historical portions of the Bible. The vernacular translations of the Bible were also discussed and criticized, and evaluated as to reliability.

Government and civics were probably not studied, for the Talmud is almost devoid of references to these subjects. One authority remarked about the study of government;

...If all seas were ink, all reeds, pens; the heavens all parchment, and all men writers, they would not suffice to write down the intricacies of government.

History was not studied in any chronological order. Some history was gained through study of the Bible. The bulk of the historical material existed in the form of hero stories and legends which grew up around Biblical characters and Talmudic authorities.

There was a great deal of teaching of science and medicine. The Rabbis were concerned with the human body and its functions for religious reasons, and from this, a great medical lore grew. It appeared that the Academy served as medical center for the community, and sick people were brought there for treatment.

The formal study of philosophy did not exist. Though various Academies worked out different modes of religious behavior, these codes were worked out on the basis of determining what God wanted man to do. There was no concern with Who God was, or where He was.

Certain other subjects were studied in a few Academies. Some of the rabbis taught comparative religion, by urging their students to attend the houses of worship of gentiles. Astronomy and geometry were studied as they applied to calculation of the year and determination of Sabbath limits. Art was studied through an examination of the architecture of the Temple and analysis of the murals on its walls. Study of music existed through a study of the Psalms, the historical study of the music used in the Temple service, and the determination of the chants in the liturgical service in the synagogue. Some authorities taught mysticism and magic though this was condemned by most of the rabbis. The scholars were also taught ritual slaughtering, circumcision, writing of scrolls and preparation of religious objects.

Certain areas of study were strictly forbidden. Greek philosophy was interdicted;

Ben Deman...asked R. Ishmael, May one such as I who have studied the whole of the Torah learn Greek wisdom? He thereupon read to him the following verse, This book of the Law shall not depart out of thy mouth, but thou shalt meditate therein day and night. Go then and find a time that is neither day nor night, and learn the Greek wisdom.

Even the most liberal of the rabbis, R. Ishmael, flatly outlawed the study of anything other than Jewish material. Historically, the ban on Greek studies came from the time of the Hasmonean kings, when the Greeks were invited in to settle a civil war. The rabbis feared that Greek philosophy and Greek military power would destroy their state, and from that point forward, the rule was, "...cursed be the man who rears pigs, and cursed be the man who teaches his son Greek wisdom."

The writings of Christians and other sectarians were also forbidden, except to the heads of Academies. The heads made some attempt at teaching apologetics, and provided some information to the students about the practices of Christians. The horrible example held up to the students was that of Elisha b. Abuyah, a great rabbi, who studied the writings of other peoples and became an atheist. To avoid becoming like him, students were told to avoid this sort of study.

The necessity of banning non-Jewish writings implied that these writing were having some circulation among the rabbis at the Academies. It is probably for this reason that Greek words and ideas frequently appear in the Talmud, with no specific references to Greek authorities.

The curriculum of the Academies was firmly based, then, on Jewish subject matter. The whole curriculum had a religious base.

The purpose of oral discourse or disputation was always related in some way to Torah in general, and Oral Law in particular. In one statement, R. Johanan stated bluntly that, "God made a covenant with Israel only for the sake of that which was transmitted orally." The object of oral discourse was to determine the law orally, and then explain this law.

The Talmud makes no explicit mention of an art of public speaking. Based on Deuteronomic dictum to teach the law diligently to the children, the Scribes began to interpret the Pentateuch in public. This took the form of a lecture interpreting the meaning of a Scriptural verse. This same method was used by the rabbis later on in the Synagogue. From this interpretation of Scripture grew the interpretation of Oral Law and the determination by the rabbis of new law from the Oral Law.

The ribbis disagreed on the actual importance of oral communication. It should be noted here that their comments on oral communication were not made during the course of a study of rhetoric but were interpolations into a religious discussion. One authority commented on the use of the word, "persuasion" in scripture stating that, "persuasion is Scripture never means with words." According to his view, persuasion comes about through, "eating and drinking." Another authority advocated silence, except when it was necessary to give judgment. Hillel's counter-part, Shammai, told his students to, "...speak little but do much."

The majority of the authorities however, hold that public speaking is exceedingly important. Rabbah for example interpreted the Biblical passage in Numbers dealing with the speech of Caleb as meaning that, "...he won the people with words."

There was a general scarcity of written materials in the Academies which enhanced the importance of oral communication. Most of the rabbinic authorities agreed that those things which existed in writing should not be reported orally, and conversely, those things which were originally oral should not be put in writing. These things must be committed to memory and recited orally. The only written material which existed officially was the Bible, all other material was oral for the vast majority of the rabbis. There appeared to be a general prohibition on writing down anything other than the Bible. The task of writing was considered to be so exacting that those who knew how to write were told to confine their writing to Scripture. The leading authorities were quite explicit about this prohibition. R. Johanan stated flatly that as far as the Academy was concerned, the Oral Law superseded the Bible. According to George Foot Moore, this expressed a fundamental principle of Judaism. The belief was that all religion is revealed; that the whole revelation was given to Moses, and there fore, man was in possession of the whole law. According to this view, the Bible is only a small portion of that law. The bulk of it was oral, and means for discovering the law was also oral. Thus the extensive use of oral communication came about to fill the gap caused by the lack of valid texts.

The work of the Academies was directly related to the traditional unbroken succession of the revelation. There was a Divine sanction given to revelation or explanation of the law, and since the whole content of revelation was religion, and since religion pervaded every phase of life, the Talmudic discourse had Divine sanction for its existence, and was free to deal with any phase of life. Tradition held that the law was given to Moses orally, and he was enjoined not to reduce this law to writing, but to transmit it to future generations, orally. Moses did not receive a law for every detail of life, but he received a framework form which the law could be deduced. Because of this, in many situations, Mishnah took precedence over the Bible. The Bible was understandable only as it was explained and applied by Mishnah. Thus the rabbis generally followed a pattern of concentration on oral matters.

The rabbis, themselves, deduced Divine sanction to justify oral communication. One authority cited a legend which described the reaction of Moses who was allowed by God to visit the Academies. Moses was bewildered by the complexity of the discussions there, but God comforted him by explaining that this came directly from His revelation on Mount Sinai. Thus Moses understood that the law was not given to him in its final form, but was given by an omnipotent God, Who recognized that His words would become the subject of speculation. Therefore the discussions and disputations at the Academies served a Divine end. Many of the great figures in the Bible were cited as having taught in the same fashion as the rabbis at the Academies. Thus the sanction for public speaking was reinforced by Divine will and by historical tradition. The rabbis engaged in a continual process of deriving sanction for their method of oral teaching. Frequent references were made to Biblical figures participating in oral discourse and disputation. The Academic lecture was raised almost to the status of religious worship by the rabbis, when they pointed out that since the Temple had been destroyed, God had halachah alone as a form of religious worship. The ability to discourse well was granted by Divine decree to the rabbis who fulfilled the religious precepts. God, Himself, according to the rabbis, used the same teaching methods as the rabbis. God, according to this view, took no action without consulting his heavenly Academy. God frequently intervened into the disputations at the Academy, thus showing His interest in the discussions held there. In a powerful, rhetorical passage the rabbis give Divine sanction to their practice of rhetoric;

It has been taught: On that day R. Eliezer brought forward every imaginable argument, but they did not accept them. [R. Eliezer was disputing with his colleagues and could not get a vote in his favor.] Said he to them: 'If the halachah agrees with me, let this carob-tree prove it.' Thereupon the carob-tree was torn a hundred cubits out of its place... 'No proof can be brought from a carob-tree,' they retorted. [The majority of the rabbis held that human reason was superior to miraculous proof.] Again he said to them: 'If the halachah agrees with me, let this stream of water prove it.' Whereupon the stream of water flowed backwards. 'No proof can be brought from a stream of water,' they rejoined. Again he urged: 'If the halachah agrees with me, let the walls of the schoolhouse prove it.' whereupon the walls inclined to fall. But R. Joshua rebuked the schoolhouse walls saying; 'When scholars are engaged in a halachic dispute, what have ye to interfere?' ...Again he said to them: 'If the halachah agrees with me, let it be proved from Heaven.' Whereupon a heavenly voice cried out: 'Why do ye dispute with R. Eliezer seeing that in all matters the halachah agrees with him?' But R. Joshua arose and exclaimed: 'It is not in heaven' What did he mean by this? Said R. Jeremiah: 'That the Torah had already been given at Mount Sinai; we pay no attention to a Heavenly voice, because thou hast long since written in the Torah at Mount Sinai, After the majority must one incline.

...The Holy One...laughed with joy...saying, My sons have defeated me.

This remarkable passage makes it clear, in the minds of the rabbis, God approved of their practice of rhetoric. It indicates that the rabbis reserved for themselves the right to dispute, without outside interference and subject to majority rule, any detail of human life. God's laughter at the conclusion approves that doctrine that man is in possession of God's whole law, and it is up to man to determine how to discover, how to use it, and how to follow it. The discovery of the halachah would correspond to the classical concept of invention, while the communication of halachah involved disposition, style and delivery, the whole process resting on a body of knowledge mastered through memory. Thus, while it was not explicitly stated in the Talmud, the elements of a rhetorical system existed in the very nature of the purpose and process of oral communication at the Academies. The teaching methods used at the Academies made rhetoric the most important element in the whole process.

In addition to a discussion of an assigned topic, the members of the Academy lectured to the visitors on problems which had arisen during the year. During these lectures, they reviewed the decisions reached in the Academy on these community problems.

Aside from the size of the audience, the kallah lectures followed essentially the same pattern as the lectures in the Academy. Out of courtesy to the lecturer, the members of the Academy refrained from questioning the speaker, but the floor was still open for question on the part of the visitors.

The Kalloth were set after the harvest so that the maximum number of people could attend. There is no accurate estimate of the size of these audiences, but one Talmudic passage, which may be hyperbolic, estimates the audience at 10,000. One rabbi indicated that demons attended these sessions because they could lose themselves in the crowd and push and crush the rabbis. Some authorities held that simple attendance at these gatherings fulfilled religious precept, since the crowds were so large, most people could not hear the speakers.

The rabbis did a great deal of speaking during these sessions. All judicial and homiletic functions of the rabbis were abandoned during the kallah periods, since, in order to reach the maximum number of people, the rabbis conducted lectures day and night. The Kallah lectures were basically explanatory, the idea of the rabbis being to make as much of their knowledge available to people in outlying communities, so that disputes arising in those communities could be speedily and equitably settled.

Thus, the speaking opportunities provided at the Academy occurred day and night, all year round. The rabbis and students had ample opportunity for self expression, both in the form of lecture and disputation.

The head of the Academy did the bulk of the lecturing. He opened the meetings of the Academy with a prepared lecture, by asking someone else to lecture, by stating a topic for discussion or by simply stating, "ask", indicating that the students should select the topic.

The speaker began his lecture while standing, but usually, he sat down after beginning. The other officials of the Academy sat on a bench at the front of the audience, with the head of the Academy in the center. The students were grouped around in a semi-circle, either seated on lower benches or on the ground. The speaker was always raised above the students, sometimes with cushions. The students were crowded closely around the speaker and if there was room at the rear, people from the community were allowed to stand and listen. For important lectures the sessions were sometimes moved outdoors so that more people could attend them.

When a prepared lecture was delivered, it was usually concerned with a complex matter of halachah stemming from a situation which had arisen in the community which the lecturer felt was important to the students. This type of lecture contained very little haggadic material, since the rabbis felt that the synagogue was the proper place for this and further, because later on in the session, it might be necessary to use haggadah to break the monotony and regain attention of the students. Prepared Halachic lectures were held to be so important that if an important member of the academy came in late, the speaker would go back to the beginning for his benefit. These lectures were always subject to interruption for questions, but it appeared that in many cases, the students allowed the lecturer to finish the prepared portion before questioning.

When the formula, "ask", was used, this served as a signal for open discussion. The students could conceivably ask the lecturer to explain something they could not understand. They might ask for a statement on a controversial issue, on which they disagreed with the view of the lecturer, so that they might have a chance to dispute with him. The students had the right to ask the lecturer to lecture on either halachah or haggadah. Sometimes these requests taxed the ingenuity of the lecturer;

When R. Ammi and R. Assi were sitting before R. Isaac the Smith, one of them said to him; 'Will the Master please tell us some legal points?' while the other said: 'Will the Master please give us some homiletical instruction?' When he commenced a homiletical discourse he was prevented by the one, and when he commenced a legal discourse, he was prevented by the other. He therefore said to them, 'I will tell you a parable: to what is this like? To a man who has two wives, one young and one old. the young one used to pluck out his white hairs, whereas the old one used to pluck out his black hair. He thus finally remained bald on both sides. I will accordingly tell you something which will be equally interesting to both of you.'

R. Isaac then proceeds to discuss the law on lighting of fires on the Sabbath, using homiletics, the interpretation of Biblical verses to present his point of view.

Halachah always took precedence in the Academy, and normally in a request for both halachah and haggadah, and lecturer would speak on halachah. In some cases, however, the lecturer was not ready to speak on the topic requested. In these cases the lecturer would use this request as the basis for the next day's lecture, thus giving himself time to prepare.

The audience was brought into direct relation with the speech by allowing free questioning and discussion during the lecture. Some of the rabbis selected prize students and charged them with the responsibility of interrupting the lecture to ask questions. These questions were prepared by the students, and were designed to catch lagging interest, or to change the pattern from lecture to disputation. Some of the rabbis objected to these interruptions and called down curses on the students that interrupted them. These curses did not stop the interruptions, since the right to interrupt was very highly prized in the academies.

This privilege of interruption maintained student interest, and provided the format for the academic disputation. A typical Talmudic passage describing a academic session presents an anonymous lecture discussing the time of day when the morning prayer should be recited. After the lecturer responds by showing that these authorities expressed their views in different countries and under different conditions. The lecturer then cites support for his view from Scripture and cites authorities which agree with him. A vote is then taken, and the majority of the academy votes for the point of view of the lecturer. This appears to be the general pattern of the daily academic session. At the review session, the vice-head officiated, and he was not usually interrupted during his discourse since the students could carry on their discussion after he had completed his review.

The subject matter of most of the lectures was halachah. Some examples are the lecture of R. Tanhum on extinguishing fires; R. Nahman on determining ownership in land disputes; R. Johanan on how to get along with non-Jews; Raba on methods of taxation; R. Joshua on determination of the holidays; and R. Hanian on the proper size of dowries. Even the lectures which dealt with haggadah were not comparable to the inspirational lectures delivered in the synagogues, and dealt with such topics as, how to calm down an angry man or what precautions to observe when lending money. A number of the lectures dealt in full or in part with the justification of the scholar as the leading figure in the community. Some of the lectures were on theoretical matters of behavior such as "the frequent practice of sexual intercourse is desirable", "charity must be given to maintain the community", "the Israelite is intellectually superior to his neighbor", or "the advantages of being rich and intelligent". There was little mention of anything that might be construed as eschatology or metaphysics.

Unreal topics came in for their share of discussion. The Temple service, which had been abandoned long before, was frequently discussed as were other archaic laws. Stories and fables were also included. These were usually hero stories about great intellectuals like Hillel and Nahum of Gimzo; the vanquishing of the scholars of Athens or the defeat in a disputation of Alexander of Macedon.

On rare occasions, visiting lecturers were allowed to speak in the Academy. Sometimes these were itinerant preachers who were invited in so that the students could dispute with their strange views. It is possible that some of the preaching of St. Paul came about in this way. The itinerant preachers usually dealt with material that the rabbis considered mysticism or esoterica. They were compelled to submit to question and disputation from the heads of the academy as well as the students.

Frequently the heads of other Academies visited. On these occasions they were allowed to participate in the sessions and were frequently called upon to speak extempore upon their specialties. On these occasions they were given the same courtesies and subject to the same interruptions as the heads of the home Academy.

A fundamental principle of public speaking at the academies was the doctrine of free speech. According to Graetz:

Freedom of speech...became so firmly established a right that no one could be attacked for expressing...opinions, unless he controverted any received dogma or rejected the conception of the Divinity peculiar to Judaism.

The Talmudic passage describing the deposition of R. Gamaliel as the head of the Academy of Jabneh reveals this spirit of free speech. Gamaliel frequently insulted the highly respected R. Joshua. The members of the Academy were so concerned about these insults that they voted Gamaliel out of office, and as an insult to him, replaced him as head with an eighteen year old. After his restoration to office, he confirmed the principle of free speech which guided later Talmudic speaking. The Talmud holds that difference of opinion is natural, necessary and to be encouraged. One significant passage points out that it is expected that two rabbis would differ in opinion, but the only type of dispute that was wrong is when two rabbis differed about what a third rabbi said. Students were told that they were expected to speak out when they detected an error made by their teachers, or when they felt that the conclusion was wrong. Students were told that the Bible says, From a false matter keep far and therefore they had an obligation to see that truth resulted from every disputation.

Because of the frequent clash of opinion, students were advised to show tolerance toward the views of others. They were told to respect another scholar's decisions, unless they could prove them wrong. Raba indicated that if scholars were intolerant of each other, it provoked the anger of God, while Resh Lakish held that if scholars were tolerant it would multiply peace in the world.

The concept of free speech and respect for other opinions is one of the factors that makes the Talmud the jumble that it is. there are few absolute decisions reached. A majority view and a minority view are recorded in almost every case, and the minority is not absolutely obligated to bow to the will of the majority. In many cases where the halachah is not firmly established, each individual was allowed to follow and to express his own view. In many cases, even when agreement is reached, and a decision made, the minority view is recorded, so that later generations might understand the reasons and conceivably decide to follow that view. It was held by the leading authorities that any decision might be overthrown if time and circumstances demanded it. It must be remembered, however, that the discipline of the academy was strong, and individuals rarely differed from the view of the majority unless their feeling was exceedingly strong.

Generally, then, the characteristics of the Talmudic discourse were that it was largely extemporized, it was subject to interruption for discussion and question, it usually dealt with halachah, using haggadah sparingly. Its dominant feature was freedom of speech.

This continual clash of opinion at the Academies was called, shekla v't'ri'a or literally, "taking up and throwing back."

Disputations in the Academies usually arose spontaneously. Sometimes the lecturer would throw out a challenge to the whole assembly to dispute with him. Exuberant phrases like, "...Behold, I am like Ben Azzai in the streets of Tiberias," made clear the willingness of the lecturer to dispute with his students. Usually the disputations arose from the subject matter of the lecture. A question from a student would lead to an answer form another student, and the issue would then be disputed until it was settled by vote, or it was agreed that the issue could not be settled. Some of the students interrupted the lecturer to heckle, to challenge their authorities or their reasoning. R. Ammi and R. Assi did this heckling silently, by rudely turning their faces away from the lecturer when they disagreed with him. Because of the insult the lecturer was forced to question them about their point of view, and the disputation would begin. The frequency of occurrence of words like "argument" and "disputation" leads to the conclusion that virtually every speech delivered inside the Academy led to some sort of disputation.

Though many of the disputations in the Talmud are anonymous, there are several pairs of consistent opponents whose controversies are reported in great detail. some of the most frequent are R. Johanan vs. Resh Lakish, Raba vs. Abaye, and Rab vs. Samuel. No set of rules was laid down for these disputations, and since there appears to be no consistent form followed in the debates, it is likely that no rules existed. They were apparently extempore based on a quick use of the knowledge possessed by the disputants. Sometimes courtesy prevailed, and the disputant would wait until the lecturer had finished but on other occasions, when tempers were flaring, the disputant would interrupt. One of the rabbis is said to have, "cried like a crane" in order to get his point of view expressed.

Some of the disputations were quite heated. One account states that two disputing rabbis grew so excited that they committed the major sin of tearing a Torah scroll in their excitement. Though displays of this sort are rare, many of the disputations did descend to name-calling and personal vilification.

Some of the rabbis attempted to maintain decorum during debates. One authority, while confirming the right of the student to interrupt the lecturer to dispute, expressed concern over the name-calling that sometimes resulted and asked that it be stopped. R. Jannai made it a practice to expel any student that he felt was indecorous in disputation, and who disputed out of a sense of competitiveness rather than a sincere belief in his point of view.

Some of the debates may have been partially prepared. One passage indicates that students were sometimes asked to gather information, generally, on a certain subject. The lecturer would then question them about it, using this to stimulate a debate.

Debates may have been carried on through a meturgeman. When the meturgeman was used, he was used only by the lecturer, unless the disputant was of equal rank. In disputes of this type, all questions and arguments were addressed to the meturgeman, who would then ask his rabbi for the answers.

No time limits were placed on the debates. Some were exceedingly long and, on occasion, lasted all day. The length of the disputation was determined by the importance of the topic, the number of participants, and the leniency of the lecturer in allowing the students to dispute with him. No set pattern was used for an opening. In addition to the privilege that the student had of interrupting the lecturer, the lecturer had the right to ask any student to rise and defend his opinions. When visitors from another Academy came to a session, they were usually invited to match their wits through disputation with the students. When the visitor was distinguished, he was invited to dispute with the head of the Academy. In a few cases debate was carried on between two heads of Academies by messenger. The statement of one disputant was delivered to the other. He and his students would work out an answer and send it back. The first Academy would then prepare an answer and return it. These debates would sometimes continue over a period of years.

The subject matter of the debates covered every field of life. Many of them dealt with matters of applying general law to specific occurrences. Some of these were:

1. R. Huna vs. Rabbah on the inheritance of estates by women.

2. Rab vs. Samuel on size of legacies of brothers.

3. Raba vs. R. Aha on payment of damages caused by cattle.

4. R. Abba vs. 'Ulla on responsibilities of finders of lost property.

5. R. Nahman vs. R. Shesheth on the legal form of a business contract.

Since the Academy was the authority for the religious behavior of the community, many of the debates were about religious matters. some good examples are;

1. R. Abba b. Ahabah vs. R. Eleazar b. Zadok on the proper method of intercalating the year to determine the date of holidays.

2. Rabina vs. R. Nahman b. Isaac on the proper time of the day to recite the prayer of sanctification for the Sabbath.

3. Abaye vs Rabbah on the application of the ban on writing on the Sabbath.

4. R. Johanan vs. Resh Lakish on purification after handling an article that was ritually unclean.

Frequently, debates occurred over matters of procedure and interpretation, like;

1. R. Abba vs Rabina on the right of the Academy to discuss personal disputes that were not specifically referred to it.

2. R. Johanan vs. R. Eleazar on the proper method of quoting authorities.

3. R. Joseph vs. R. Abba and R. Huna on the proper method of closing a debate in an Academy.

Debates also took place about highly personal matters of human behavior. Some examples are;

1. R. Judah vs his students on the ethicality of therapeutic abortion.

2. R. Bibi vs Raba on the permissibility of spitting on the floor of a synagogue.

3. R. Eliezer vs. his students on the length of quarantine of a house when its occupant has been stricken with leprosy.

Disputes were sometimes hypothetical, and concerned outdated rituals. The temple service and agricultural laws of Palestine were debated long after the Temple had been destroyed and Palestine lost. This was done since some authorities felt that talking about these laws which could not be performed, was a substitute for the performance of the laws. Other authorities held that discussions of this type sharpened the wits of the students. Some examples are;

1. R. Eleazar vs R. Johanan on thanks-offerings in the Temple.

2. Resh Lakish vs. R. Eleazar on sin-offerings in childbirth.

3. Resh Lakish vs. R. Johanan on slaughtering of animal sacrifices.

Several of the debates concern the interpretation of other debates. These deal with the debates of earlier authorities, and attempt to ascertain who won. This type of debate usually occurred during the course of another debate, and usually began when one disputant attempted to use the statements of an earlier authority in order to prove his view. This led directly to the debate about the debate of the earlier authorities.

Several of the debates were actually what we, today, would call group discussion in the sense in which the word was used by McBurney and Hance. During these, many rabbis presented their views in an attempt to resolve a difficulty. These discussions covered problems of misunderstanding and misinterpretation, like the proper method of reading a word or phrase, the definition of a word, the reason for the existence of a certain law, the principles underlying differences of opinion, and reasons for inconsistencies in the view of different authorities. These discussions usually took place during the review sessions at the close of a lecture or were held privately outside the Academy, and were generally reported back at the next day's session in order to get an answer from the lecturer. Sometimes these discussions interrupted the lecture. Several passages record these discussions being conducted while the lecturer dozed in his chair. Usually, the lecturer awoke in time to settle the issue.

Several disputations are recorded that appear to be fictional. These debates involve a member of the Academy and one or more non-Jews. Frequently, these non- Jews are great historical figures and probably the disputes were included to very the monotony of halachah. They were usually reported in the course of a lecture. For example, one dispute reports the debate of Rabban Gamaliel with the Emperor of Rome. Another reports the debate between the rabbis and Alexander of Macedon. A Third concerns Joshua b. Hananiah vs. the Scholars of Athens. Debates of this type, reported in the course of a lecture, also provided a format in which philosophical material could be discussed. Apparently, two rabbis would not philosophize, but if a gentile brought up a question, it must be answered.

Some casuisty and hair-splitting arose from the fictitious debates. This was not tolerated in the regular halachic disputation, and students were expelled from the Academy for indulging in casuistry. Pelemo was expelled by Judah Ha-Nasi when he asked how a man with two heads could put on phylacteries. The students had the privilege of asking any serious question, no matter how foolish it sounded, since this was how learning came about, but he could not raise issues merely to display his wit, or to embarrass the lecturer. Skill at dialectic was distinguished from casuistry. The good rabbi was supposed to have, "keen dialectics," which was defined as the ability to give many reasons for declaring a thing clean or unclean. These reasons must be valid, and the rabbi must believe in his point of view, and not present the reasons simply out of a spirit of competition. The only use of casuistry that was considered justifiable was on the part of the lecturer to gain attention from the students, or to provide humor, or to test the skill of the student in recognizing faulty argument.

The rabbis held debate in very high esteem. They agreed that one of the qualifications of a students, before he could be ordained is that he should know how to dispute, and be skilled in, "...the warfare of the Torah." Disputation penetrated into every activity of the Academy, and was another characteristic of public address in the Talmudic Academy.

This statement indicates that, although the rabbis held authorities in high regard, it was still considered necessary to present the reasons for the conclusion drawn by the authority. In practice, however, many of the authoritative sources like the Bible, the Mishnah, and certain of the individual rabbis were accepted at face value by their listeners, without the necessity of presenting proof.

Scripture, of course, was considered the highest authority. Even when a recognized scholar presented an opinion, it was necessarily related to Scripture, so that the listener could recognize the authoritative religious basis for the statement. Since the purpose of the Talmudic lecture was to apply Scripture to everyday situations to determine the halachah, it was necessary that logical proofs for the conclusion as to what was halachah have some relation to Scripture. Many rabbis considered a simple Scriptural exegesis made by a recognized authority as a superior, irrefutable proof, and in fact, R. Akiba once side, "...if this is an authentic tradition we shall accept it, but if it is only a logical deduction, there is a rebuttal." The implication here is that the association of the name of a recognized authority with his proof makes a statement irrefutable. Since Scripture was held to be Divine, statements relating to Scripture, if made by humans recognized as authorities, were also held to be Divine.

There was also established a clear cut hierarchy of authority which determined the exact degree of authority a given individual could wield. For example, a Scribe could not dispute Scripture, directly; a Tanna could not dispute the direct word of a Scribe; an Amora could not reverse the direct statement of a Tanna, and within each category, certain individuals ranked above others. This ranking of authorities was determined by the following generally accepted criteria: (1) determination of whether the authority was a teacher or student, since the authority of the teacher was superior; and (2) the size and reputation of the Academy with which the authority was associated. Further tests of an authority were his familiarity, or lack thereof, with the material under discussion, and the field in which the authority was held to be an expert. R. Ashi, for example, was considered the final Talmudic authority, since he was the head of the last Academy, and was popularly believed to be the redactor of the Talmud. R. Eliezer, who only quoted the opinions of others was considered a highly valid authority, since, in the few cases where he did render a decision, his views were regarded as "...thoroughly sifted," and in the few cases where his opinion clashes with that of another authority, his opinion is regarded as correct. R. Zera cautioned his scholars to reject any statement of Baraita that was not traceable back to R. Hiyya and R. Oshaiah, since he held that these were the men who made the original collection of Baraita and were, therefore, the recognized authorities in that field. R. Abiathar was considered to be poor authority, since he had been caught in many mis-statements. Rabbah b. Bar Hana was regarded as the champion liar of the Talmud, and his opinions were invalid in all matters of halachah, but he was regarded as worthy of listening to since his tall tales were interesting.

Authorities were also qualified on the basis of their personal reputations. R. Hiyya was regarded as "...accurate in reporting the statements of his teacher." R. Eleazar was known as "...a great man," and therefore, a worth authority. R. Johanan b. Zakkai was an accepted authority because "...during his whole life he never uttered profane talk nor walked four cubits without studying the Torah." R. Zera pointed out that a valid authority engaged in frequent reviews with his teacher, and was constantly checking the validity of his opinions. It was generally accepted that the opinion of the head of an Academy would have more weight than that of any of his associates, while the direct statement of an authority had more weight than a reported statement of an authority.

If an individual qualified as an authority, it was usually mandatory that his views be accepted, provided he presented some sort of proof for his opinion. Actually it was immaterial what proof was presented, since there are several examples of discussions in the Talmud of alternate proofs that an authority could have presented to arrive at the same conclusion. Thus, conclusions drawn from the statements of an authority were superior to conclusions drawn through pure reasoning not based on any recognized authority. No matter how sound the reasoning, individual argument could be refuted by citing the documented opinion of a recognized authority. Failure to present valid authorities for a view obligated the speaker to present some sort of proof for his opinion, and if no authority could be found to take the opposite view, then the question could be debated on its logical merits.

The doctrine of majority also applied to the use of authorities in proof. It was agreed that when several authoritative statements could be found which agreed on the halachah, these statements determined the halachah. Throughout the Talmud, when the opinion of an individual is presented along with an anonymous opinion, the anonymous opinion represented the view of the majority and was, therefore, the valid one. Though the opinions of individuals in conflict with the majority are sometimes cited, they are cited in accordance with the doctrine of minority freedom, and are not considered to be valid halachah.

A great deal of respect was paid to the opinions of living authorities. In any practical debate, the opinion of one authority could not reverse the opinion of a contemporary authority who had ruled on the question previously. This was based on the traditional theory that no assembly could annul the decision of another assembly unless it was superior in both wisdom and numbers. If two equal authorities clashed, they were presumed to be equal in wisdom and since neither was superior in numbers, the view of one could not overrule the view of another. When two contemporary authorities clashed directly, the process of majority vote was used to determine the halachah. If no vote was taken, the problem was left unsolved.

The actual use made of authorities as a form of proof appeared to conform to a generally accepted methodology. Phrases like:

R. Simeon b. Zebid said in the name of R. Isaac b. Tabla in the name of R. Hiyya Areka of the school of R. Aha in the name of R. Zera in the name of R. Eleazar in the name of R. Hanania in the name of R. Mi'asha on the authority of R. Judah b. Ilai...

are characteristic of the method used to cite authorities in proof. The rabbis took pains to report the sources of their authoritative statements accurately. The long list of names in the example indicates that the opinion presented was a view of long standing, and the names trace it back to its origin, while the name of each authority who previously cited it, gives the opinion added weight. The rabbis were required to repeat statements of authorities as they were made. If they did not hear the statement directly from the authority, they had to cite the names of the persons from whom they heard it, so that if an inaccuracy was discovered, it could be traced back to its source. It was not considered sufficient to capture the spirit of the statement of an authority, for, "...a man must cite...in the exact language of his master." There is a case recorded in the Talmud where a lecturer made an error in pronunciation, which was reported in his name later, exactly as he made it. The quoted error then became acceptable as a basis for proof.

The meturgeman, in particular, was cautioned to be exact in his language, since he was the mouth of an authority and could hold no opinions of his own. R. Eliezer was one of the most highly regarded Talmudic authorities. His claim to fame was that he was absolutely unoriginal. R. Eliezer boasted that he never said a word in presenting proofs unless it was an exact quote from a previous authority, and he never held an opinion unless another authority had held the opinion before him.

The rabbis were quite jealous of their statements. They expressed great concern when other persons reported their statements and did not give them credit for them. There appeared to be a generally accepted method of oral footnotes, and in cases where these footnotes were not given, severe criticism was leveled against the speaker. Two notorious critics were R. Ammi and R. Assi, who attended lectures in order to catch errors in reporting authorities. On the positive side, rabbis were praised when they discovered the author of an anonymous statement. When two conflicting statements about the same topic were reported in the name of one authority, neither could be accepted until the correct statement had been discovered.

A few of the rabbis were directly concerned with the qualifications of an authority in whose name a statement was made. R. Dosa b. Harkinas was concerned with speakers reporting his decisions correctly in his name, since he had a brother who was unreliable. Raba cautioned his disciples to examine quotations in his name very carefully, since he frequently made statements for teaching purposes only, and did not wish these to be used in presenting a proof. A number of authorities stressed the idea of checking quotations to make sure that the person to whom it was attributed had really said it.

In order to follow the clash of authorities, particularly in disputation, authority identifications are found in the Talmud. Some of the major ones are;

'It was argued before the sages' refers to Simeon b. Azzai, Simeon b. Zoma, Hanan the Egyptian and Hanania b. Hakinai who were not ordained but were permitted because of scholastic achievment to be considered as authorities...'Our Rabbis in Babylon' refers to Rab and Samuel. 'Our Rabbis in Eretz Israel' refers to R. Abba. 'The Judges of the Exile' to Karna; 'The Judges of Eretz Israel' to R. Ammi and R. Assi; 'The Judges of Pumbeditha' to R. Papa and Samuel; 'The Judges of Nehardes' to R. Adda bar Minyoni; 'The Elders of Sura' to R. Huna and R. Hisda; 'The Elders of Pumbeditha' to Rab Judah and R. 'Aina; 'The Keen Intellects of Pumbeditha' to Efa and Abimi...'The Amoraim of Pumbeditha' to Rabbah and R. Joseph; 'The Amoraim of Nehardea' to R. Hama; where we read, 'Those of Nehardea taught,' it refers to Rammi b. Berabi; 'They said in the West' refers to R. Jeremiah; 'A message was sent from Palestine' to R. Jose b. Hanina; 'They taught at it in the West' to R. Eleazar.

In Addition;

R. Meir was designated, 'other,' and R. Nathan, 'some say.'

The author of an anonymous Mishnah is R. Meir, of an anonymous Tosefta, R. Nehemiah; of an anonymous dictum in the Sifra, R. Judah; in the Sifre, R. Simeon.

Wherever you find the expression, 'A disciples, in the name of R. Ishmael, stated in the presence of R. Akiba,' the reference is to...R. Meir.

Several citations in the Talmud qualify certain authorities as superior in every case in which they clash. There is no place in the Talmud where this entire table of authority is mentioned, but throughout the Talmud are statements, placing authorities in superior position.

Following is a partial listing;

1. Because the material in Edduyoth was formulated on the day when R. Gamaliel was deposed, it is considered the most authoritative tractate of the Talmud, and opinions expressed there have more validity than opinions expressed elsewhere.

2. The material in a Mishnah is more authoritative than the material in a Baraita, Tosefta or any others of the commentaries. The opinions of Tannaim are more authoritative than opinions of Amoraim.

3. The statement of a commandment or prohibition in Scripture is more valid than a statement of a commandment or prohibition by a rabbi.

4. Where Rab and Samuel differ in regard to civil or criminal law, the halachah agrees with Samuel; in matters of ritual law, the halachah is with Rab.

5. The opinion of R. Johanan b. Zakkai takes precedence over the opinions of Rab and Samuel.

6. The opinion of R. Judah takes precedence over that of R. Simeon.

7. The opinion of R. Judah takes precedence over that of R. Meir.

8. The opinion of R. Jose takes precedence over that of R. Judah.

9. The opinion of R. Jose takes precedence over that of R. Meir.

10. The opinion of R. Jose takes precedence over that of a majority of his contemporaries.

11. The opinion of R. Johanan takes precedence over that of Samuel.

12. The opinion of R. Johanan takes precedence over that of Rab.

13. The opinion of R. Johanan takes precedence over that of R. Jeremiah.

14. The opinion of R. Johanan takes precedence over that of Resh Lakish except in three specific cases.

15. The opinion of R. Meir takes precedence over that of R. Simeon.

16. The opinion of R. Judah Ha-Nasi takes precedence over the opinion of any of his contemporaries or followers.

The qualification of Hillel as the authority par excellence provides the model for the whole scale of authority. Hillel is the prototype of the ideal rabbi. Shammai, his counterpart, reveals over strictness, impatience, and over- zealousness on minor matters. Virtually every Talmudic debate brings in some of the difference between Hillel and Shammai. Hillel was always victorious, and the rule was established that the view of Hillel was supreme. This was reinforced by an alleged declaration from Heaven that, "...the halachah is with...Hillel." The elevation of Hillel to highest authority provided the precedent for the later elevation of other rabbis to more authoritative roles.

The Talmudic concept of the use of authority as a superior source for the derivation of rhetorical deduction derived its sanction form one of the legends about Hillel. According to this legend, when Hillel arrived in Jerusalem, the Elders were engaged in a dispute about a difficult point of law. Hillel settled the dispute. The Elders demanded that he provide authority along with his logical reasoning, and Hillel cited the Scriptural chapter and verse to support his view, pointing out that the Elders were justified in asking for this authority, since questions of such importance must be settled by proof and authority, and not by only one of them. It is a frequent occurrence in the Talmud, for a rabbi who has just presented a logical proof, to be asked for a concurring authority, and the rabbi who presents authority alone is generally asked to cite the proof. The principle appears to be that authority without proof is frequently weak; proof without authority is always weak. Many of the rabbis felt that statements from great authorities of the past, together with the original proofs, were irrefutable, but any logical deduction without an authority allowed for a rebuttal. The scholar who based his decisions on reports of accepted authorities is held to be superior to the original thinker or the mere quoter of opinions. Rabina pointed to himself as typifying what is desirable in proof by saying;

I am neither a self-pretended scholar[speaking on my own authority] nor a visionary [telling stories] nor unique, but I am a teacher [who reports correctly the statements of others] and a systemtizer of traditions [who provides reasons for the views of the authorities.]

Observed fact and testimony of witnesses was used only incidentally in presentation of proof. When it was used, it was carried over from the legal system. The concept of burden of proof, for example, is explicitly stated in the legal code;

The Sages...say that it is a fundamental principle in law that the onus probandi falls on the claimant. Why was it necessary to state, 'this is a fundamental principle in law?' It was necessary to imply that even where the plaintiff is positive and defendant dubious, it is still the plaintiff on whom falls onus probandi.

This is reinforced by the idea that, "it is the plaintiff who has the onus of proving his case by evidence." The carryover into the Academy is explicitly stated by R. Ishmael, "...the onus is upon the person who expresses the stricter view to produce the proof." This was agreed to by the entire Academy on the day of the deposition of Rabban Gamaliel, and , therefore, it holds a special validity. The milder view on a halachah is held to prevail until those holding the stricter view can prove their point to a majority of the Academy.

Although there is no stated doctrine of probabilities, the idea of probabilities occurred to many of the individual rabbis. Much of this material, also, arose from law cases, but there is some carryover into the Academic lecture and disputation. An anonymous statement reads, "...determine every matter by its status." This means that unless there is specific evidence to the contrary, all things are regarded as being in the same state as they were usually known to have. The example given is that a man cannot be presumed to have left his house walking backwards unless he were observed to have walked backwards, since men do not usually leave their home walking backwards. this had its parallel in the legal maxim, that, if it is usual for a man to have presented his tithes, he is presumed to have presented them, unless contrary evidence is offered, while a man is presumed not to have paid a debt in advance, since "...the presumption is that a man does not pay a debt before it falls due."

The spirit of the law of damages provides a further basis for the use of probabilities. If an ox gores once, goring is not presumed to be a usual act for the ox. If the ox gores twice, then it is deemed likely to gore again, and if it gores a third time, then goring is presumed to be a usual act and the ox is destroyed. For use in proof in the Academy, the principle was stated, "...if a thing has happened twice, presumption is established." The legal system goes on to explain that a man's statements are accepted as true whenever a more credible and advantageous statement could have been made but was not made. The parallel in the Academy is;

R. papa said: This is borne out by the common saying, 'If you hear that your neighbor has died, believe it: if you hear that he has become rich, do not believe it.'

Any apparent exceptions to the law of probabilities are explained by the dictum that no proofs can be drawn from exceptional or unusual circumstances; and probabilities for normal times cannot be derived from abnormal times. Some of the authorities even denied the idea of probabilities entirely, like Hanan the Egyptian, "...who does not consider anything as absolutely rejected."

Although it was not widely used, there is evidence that reasoning from observed facts was held in high regard by many of the rabbis. R. Kahana, for example, state, "...where it is possible to ascertain the facts, we must do so; it is only where it is impossible...that we follow the majority." R. Meir agreed with this view, as did R. Isaac the Smith, who rejected a statement which represented the majority view by stating, "...even so, an actual incident is weightier."

Actual observation of an occurrence takes precedence over circumstantial evidence, no matter how strong the circumstantial evidence;

Our Rabbis taught: What is meant by 'Based on Conjecture?' The Judge says to him: Perhaps ye saw him running after his fellow into a ruin, ye pursued him and found him, sword in hand with blood dripping from it, whilst the murdered man was writhing in agony; If this is what ye saw, ye saw nothing.

Many of the rabbis conducted experiments based on observation in order to derive inductive proofs. R. Simeon b. Halafta was considered the foremost of these experimenters. Two stories about him are cited;

It was said of R. Simeon b. Halafta that he was an experimenter in all things. Indeed he once made an experiment to disprove R. Judah's view [that if a hen had no down, the hen was ritually unclean and could not be eaten.]...Now R. Simeon b. Halafta once had a hen whose down was gone entirely. He put it in the oven, having first wrapped it in the warm leather apron used by bronze workers, and it grew feathers even larger than the original ones [thus rendering it clean.]...Why was he called an experimenter? R. Mesharsheya said, it is written: Go to the ant, thou sluggard; consider her ways and be wise: which having no chief, overseer or ruler provideth her bread in the summer. (prov. 6:6) R. Simeon b. Halafta said, I shall go and find out if it is true that they have no king. He went out at the summer solstice, and spread his coat over an ant-hill. When one ant came out, he marked it, and it immediately entered and informed the others that shadow had fallen, whereupon they all came forth. He then removed his coat and the sun beat down upon them. Thereupon they set upon this ant and killed it. He then said, It is clear that they have no king, for otherwise they would surely have required to obtain royal sanction.

R. Simeon, in this passage, uses the technique of drawing inferences from observed facts, which is typical of Talmudic logic.

A number of other rabbis used facts gained through observation in their proofs. R. Huna Mar b. Hiyya was confronted with tubes found inside a certain animal and was asked to declare the animal unclean. R. Huna examined other animals of this same breed and discovered that they all had the tubes and, therefore, concluded that this was normal and declared the animal clean. Rab, on one occasion, ruled that all animals must be inspected internally before they were declared clean or unclean. R. Johanan held a disputation with Hezekiah, who declared, "...a bird has no lungs." R. Johanan dissected a bird and concluded that they had lungs, which looked like rose petals, and were "...situated immediately beneath the wings." A number of the rabbis attempted to ascertain whether hair grew from the roots or the tips. they marked their beards, but unfortunately could come to no agreement. One of the best examples of the use of fact through observation is the story of R. Eleazar b. Simeon, who served as a detective for the Romans, aiding them to capture Jewish brigands. He stated his method for catching thieves;

...Go into a tavern at the fourth hour of the day [10 A.M.] If you see a man dozing with a cup of wine in his hand, ask what he is. If he is a learned man, you may assume that he has risen early to pursue his studies; if he is a day laborer, he must have been up early to do his work; if his work is the kind that is done at night, he must have been rolling thin metal. If he is none of these, he is a thief; arrest him.

Inference from observed fact, where used, took precedence over testimony of an authority as far as the Academy was concerned. Unless the authority was of the highest rank, it had to be tested against facts, if facts were available. R. Dosa b. Harkinas stated, "...How can men testify that a woman has born a child when on the next day we see her belly still swollen." Even old adages were put to the test of observation. R. Joseph said, "...We hold as a tradition that a rabbinical student will not suffer poverty. But we see that he does suffer poverty." R. Jannai said, "...A man should never stand in a place of danger and say that a miracle will be wrought for him. lest it is not." R. Papa indicated that the reason two high ranking authorities sometimes differ in their opinions is that they were considering two different sets of facts. He advised his students to check the facts upon which opinions are based before accepting the opinions. Conclusions which were drawn from hypothetical situations were held to be invalid, since anything hypothetical was conceivably impossible, and no conclusions could be drawn from impossible circumstances. Observations of one single case were generally invalid for an inductive conclusion. Only when observation led to an obvious general conclusion was it held to be valid for inductive proof.

The Academic attitude toward the presentation of evidence also had its roots in the legal system, where six basic rules for the presentation of evidence prevailed. These rules were;

1. Testimony of all witnesses to a given occurrence must agree or all testimony is invalid.

2. Only persons who actually observed an occurrence can give testimony about it.

3. Testimony based on circumstantial evidence or hearsay is invalid.

4. Witnesses were allowed to use written notes to refresh their memories as to the details of an occurrence.

5. In any conflict of testimony, the burden of proof falls on the side that seeks to derive a gain in civil law, and on the side that seeks to inflict a penalty in criminal law.

6. Witnesses must be competent. They must be male, over thirteen years of age, of sound mind and body, with no relation to any party in the case and no direct interest in its outcome.

Some of these ideas were applied to problems discussed in the Academy. R. Papa, for example, decided on the validity of documents written in the Persian language by submitting them to two Persian natives. If their views as to the contents of the document agreed, then R. Papa based his decision on this agreement.

Witnesses were not used in either the Academic lecture or disputation. The rabbis recognized the difficulty they would have in qualifying witnesses according to the legal code and, therefore, avoided their use. Though there is no explicit theory which deals with the use of observed fact and evidence in logical proof, the Talmudic discourse reveals that a great deal of weight was given to this sort of proof when used. A Talmudic legend serves as an excellent summary of the attitude of the rabbis toward drawing conclusions from observed fact;

Our rabbis taught: When Adam, on the day of his creation, saw the setting of the sun, he said, 'Alas, it is because I have sinned that the world around me is becoming dark: the universe will become again void and without form - this, then, is the death to which I have been sentenced from Heaven.' So he sat up all night, fasting and weeping, and Eve was weeping opposite him. When, however, dawn broke, he said, 'this is the usual course of the world.'

Fact, authority and evidence, when used a s proof in a speech generally followed some logical system. There is, however, no mention of a logical system in Jewish literature until the Judaeo-Arabic period (c 1100 C.E.). The work of the Arab philosophers led the Jews to a study of the logical works of Aristotle and others, but prior to this time, there is doubt whether any definite logical system had been evolved. The rabbis did devise a series of rules for the understanding and drawing of conclusions from the Bible, the so-called hermeneutic rules. According to Mielziner, the rabbis had a long tradition of application of rules of exegesis to Scriptures for the purpose of drawing conclusions. The original statement of the accepted hermeneutic rules was attributed to Jose b. Joezer (c 190 B.C.E.). As the Pharisees became the dominant group in Judaism, these rules gained wide acceptance, and served the purpose of bringing about a more liberal interpretation of the religious law.

The results of exegesis were reported orally by the rabbis to the people. The bulk of these reports were made in the synagogue, however, for exegesis was the main element of the haggadic and Midrashic lectures. Certain of the rules of hermeneutics were carried over into the Academy, and were applied to the lecturing there. Although most of the rules were used on rare occasions, certain hermeneutic rules emerged as more applicable to halachah, while others were held invalid for use in determining halachah.

The hermeneutic system which was valid in the Academy was the system set down by Hillel, based on that of Jose b. Joezer and later modified by R. Ishmael. One historian explains the principles of Hillel as follows;

By the introduction of seven rules...the oral law could be imbued with the same weight and authority as that actually contained in the Scriptures. Through these...rules, the oral law assumed quite a different aspect; it lost its apparently arbitrary character...These explanatory rules were...intended not only to justify the oral law, but also to lay down instructions on how to...meet unforeseen cases.

Hermeneutic systems were also offered by R. Akiba and R. Eliezer Ha- Galili. Their rules, however, were valid only for preaching, and allowed in teaching only as incidental material which did not affect the decision, but which served to vary the pattern of halachah. Since haggadah is neither binding, nor in the province of the Academy, the rules of R. Akiba and R. Eliezer will not be discussed here.

The rules of Hillel, as expanded by R. Ishmael served as logical systems for most of the halachic expositions in the academy. While in the realm of exegesis, these rules were universally accepted, in lecturing in the Academy and in the disputation, only a few of the rules are widely used as a method of proof. Several, however, are used on an individual basis. Recognizing that the two salient features of logical proof in the Academic lecture were the use of authorities and the presentation of evidence, it must be concluded that while some of the hermeneutic rules were used as forms of logic, the bulk of their use in lectures was to report the exegesis of earlier authorities. Many of the Tannaim used the hermeneutic rules to interpret Scripture and Mishnah. These interpretations were frequently included in lectures. The Amoraim were greatly restricted in the new laws and principles they could deduce by using these laws.

The thirteen hermeneutic rules of R. Ishmael are as follows;

1. Kal Vechomer (lit. light and heavy). A conclusion can be drawn from reasoning a specific instance from a general conclusion or a general conclusion from a specific instance included in it.

2. Gezerah Shawah and Hekkesh (lit. equal cut). Conclusions may be drawn from the existence of similar marks in two or more Biblical passages, provided that the bases of the analogy are extraneous in both.

3. Binyan Ab (lit. building). A conclusion may be drawn from similar circumstances in several instances cited in the Bible.

4. When a general term in Scripture is followed by an enumeration of particulars, that which is true of one of the particulars is also true of the others.

5. When an enumeration of particulars in Scripture is followed by the statement of a general law, only that which is included in the general law is included in any of the particulars.

6. When a particular statement lies between two general statements in the Bible, only that which is included in the particular term can be true of both general terms.

7. Conclusions cannot be drawn from statements in Scripture which are essential to each other in order to be meaningful.

8. When a general statement is accompanied by a specific statement, only that which is included in the specific statement can be true of other specific statements included in the general statement.

9. When provisions are added to a specific statement in the Bible, laws drawn from this statement are made more lenient.

10. When provisions are added to a specific statement in the Bible, which make it different from a general statement in which it was included, laws drawn from this statement are made more severe.

11. When specific statements are added to a general statement, which add new provisions to it, laws drawn from the general statement are limited to that included in the specific statements.

12. Ambiguous words and phrases in Scripture are to be understood from their context.

13. When two passages in Scripture conflict, they are invalid for conclusions until the conflict is resolved from a third passage.

The first three of the hermeneutic rules seem to indicate a form of logical system. The first, that of kal vechomer deals with the drawing of a conclusion about a particular instance from a general statement in which it is included, or about a general statement from a detail of a particular included in it. For example, if work is prohibited on a minor holiday, it is even more strongly prohibited on the Sabbath, which is considered a major holiday. In reverse, if walking for a certain distance is permitted on the Sabbath, then it is likely that walking for an even longer distance would be permitted on a holiday.

The second of the hermeneutic rules deals with analogies drawn from Scripture. The analogy of gezerah shawah is that drawn between two passages in the Bible, both of which have a term, word or letter which is superfluous in both passages. If this is the case, then what is true of one passage is also true of the other. For example, R. Habibi based a conclusion that a burnt offering brought to the Temple is rendered unclean by the existence of the extraneous word, "inside" in two sentences in Lev. 11:33. The word, "inside," is also extraneous to the passage dealing with the sin offering (Lev. 11:27) and, therefore, he concludes that what is true of one passage is also true of the other. The rabbis, apparently, recognized the weakness of this type of analogy, and agreed that no one could offer this type of proof on his own authority; it was only valid when reported in the name of a recognized previous authority, which had the effect of precluding gezerah shawah for most of the Amoraim. The hekkesh was a form of analogy drawn from two similar passages, usually connected with the conjunction, "and." For example, one authority draws the conclusion that all sacrificial animals should be slain on the north side of the alter. He bases this conclusion on the fact that Lev. 1:10 which deals with the sacrificial slaughter of cattle and is connected to the following passage, does not state which side of the altar cattle should be slain on. Since the two passages are about similar things, then, by hekkesh, he draws his conclusion.

The binyan ab appears to be a rudimentary form of induction. It is rarely used in the Talmud. A conclusion drawn from binyan ab, for example, would isolate all of the passages dealing with the high priest, taking out the specific duties of the high priest, and would then draw the conclusion that all of these are the duty of the high priest.

Rules four through eleven appear to be more concerned with literary understanding of the meaning of Bible passages, specifically, to determine when a law is to be made more general or more specific, more lenient or more severe. Conclusions based on these rules are usually the result of one of the group discussions carried on in the Academy, and these are rarely, if ever, used as a form of proof.

The last two rules are generally referred to as, "commonsense," reasoning. They tend to deny conclusions drawn through some of the more strained and arbitrary rules.

Examination of these hermeneutic rules reinforces the conclusion that their basic purpose was to provide a method of literary understanding; of determining the meaning of a given Bible passage. Through the use of these rules, the interpreter of the Bible was held closely to common sense; the basic axiom of their use was that the Bible speaks "in the language of men." Though knowledge of these rules is important in understanding the liberty of application used in the Talmud, only segments of them were ever applied to actual lecturing, and the bulk of their mention occurs in the disputation, when two authorities debated which exegesis of an authority was more valid.

A few of the rules appeared to be generally used as a form of logical proof. Kal vechomer and reasoning from proximity of texts were frequently used by the rabbis. Kal vechomer was used to reinforce a truim in this fashion;

...Now that you have concluded that execution does not supersede the Sabbath, it necessarily follows that execution does not suspend the Temple service...If the Sabbath, which is abrogated in favour of the Temple service is not set aside for execution, then the Temple service, which supersedes the Sabbath is surely not suspended.

Another example cites an anonymous lecturer who points out that by kal vechomer it can be deduced that since a Mishnah states that a man should not interrupt his prayer even if he is greeted by a king, it follows that he should not interrupt his prayer if he is greeted by a commoner. Kal vechomer thus appears as a very rudimentary form of syllogism.

Semukim, or the principle of reasoning from texts in the Bible which lie in close proximity, emerges in the form of a strained analogy. R. Meir, for example, states that controversies in the Academy should be conducted during the day, since a Scriptural verse stated, according to their word shall every controversy and leprosy be. Since it was proved that leprosies must be examined by day, and since Scripture puts these passages in close proximity, it is concluded that controversies should also be examined, or conducted, by day.

Many of the authorities felt that strained interpretations of this sort had no place in the Academic lecture, and deductions should be drawn on the basis of the context and sense of the Scriptural statement. Rab Judah advised his students not to be fooled by apparent similarities between scriptural passages, but to examine the contexts of the statements.

Despite the fact that many of the authorities advocated this simple usage in their speaking, many of the rabbis used gezerah shawah and hekkesh in their lectures. The use was rigidly controlled, and it was generally held that no rabbi could use a gezerah shawah or hekkesh of his own invention, but could only report these analogies in the name of the Scribes or Tannaim. Hence, the bulk of the appearances of the hermeneutic rules in the Talmud did not come as intrinsic parts of the lecture. Lecturers rarely based their proofs on them. Their appearances were in the form of quotations from earlier authorities.

Although the hermeneutic rules show sings of being a rudimentary logical system, the proofs in lectures and disputations in the Academy depended on the opinions of authorities, presentation of facts and evidence, and each lecturer appeared to be free to use whatever most of logical deduction he chose.

The qualities shown by Hillel in this legend were the qualities that the other rabbis tried to emulate. His teaching methods were assiduously followed and they represented the model for all Talmudic teaching. His ethics became the core of Talmudic ethics.

Thus, a good proportion of the proof presented in the Talmudic lecture and disputation was based upon the personal character of the speaker. Scholarship and learning were the essentials in the character of a rabbi, and qualification of an authority in these gave him great weight in presenting opinions. In most cases, ethical proof was a major factor in winning belief in academic lectures and disputation.

Chajes holds that the use of hyperbole, frequently found in the Talmudic lectures, was to arouse the students from sleep. Since homiletic speaking had as its function, "...impressing the people and arousing their minds," its use in the Talmudic lecture was for the same purpose. It was not necessary to give direct preaching to the students at the Academy, as it was with members of the community, and so haggadic material was used only for this purpose.

A frequent method of gaining attention was to digress to an haggadic exposition of Song of Songs, which was on of the favorite Biblical books of the rabbis. Frequently, riddles, puns, etc. were used to stimulate attention. An anonymous lecturer presented some difficult riddles in order to catch attention during a very dull lecture on the levirate marriage. These puns dealt with reasoning our complex family relationships, and the students were asked to determine which relationship was valid for a Jew, and how the other relationships could come about.

...My paternal, but not my maternal brother; and he is the husband of my mother, and I am the daughter of his wife?

...He whom I carry on my shoulder is my brother and my son and I am his sister?

...Greetings to you my son; I am the daughter of your sisters?

...Woe, Woe, for my brother, who is my father, he is my husband and the son of my husband; he is the husband of my mother and I am the daughter of his wife; children of his daughter?

...I and you are brother and sister, and I and your father are the children of brothers and I and your mother are the children of brothers.

Hyperbole was frequently used. R. Ammi and Raba pointed out that exaggeration was frequently used in the Bible, and therefore it was all right to use it in the Academy. Huge numbers were frequently used, like, "one million, two hundred thousand destroying angels."

The story of R. Eleazar the detective is a good example of the use of haggadah in the Talmudic lecture in order to gain attention. The lecture opens with an exaggeration about the health of R. Eleazer. Next, a verse from Proverbs is explained. The story of the adventures of R. Eleazar follows, and the passage finally moves on to explain the halachah on the method of answering questions raised during disputations.

Many of the lecturers used visual material and demonstrations to obtain attention. Sanction for this was derived from Hillel, who used this method in one of his most frequently quoted teachings;

A certain man once stood before Shammai and said to him, 'Master, how many Torahs have you?' "Two,' Shammai replied, 'one written and one oral.' Said the man, 'the written one I am prepared to accept, the oral one I am not prepared to accept.' Shammai rebuked him and dismissed him in a huff. He came before Hillel and said, 'Master, how many Torahs were given?' "Two,' Hillel replied, 'one written and one oral.' Said the man, 'the written one I am prepared to accept, the oral one I am not prepared to accept.' 'My son,' Hillel said to him, 'sit down.' He wrote out the alphabet for him, and pointing to one of the letters asked him, 'What is this?' 'It is Aleph,' the man replied. Said Hillel, 'This is not aleph but beth. What is that?' he continued. The man answered, 'It is beth.' 'It is not beth,; said Hillel, 'but gimmel.' In the end, Hillel said to him: 'How dost thou know that this is aleph and this beth and this gimmel? Only because our ancestors of old handed it down to us...Even as thou hast taken this in good faith, so take the other in good faith.

Not only does this passage show Hillel's reliance on authority, but the use of the written letters indicated a demonstration. This principle of instruction survives in the Jewish school, and during Talmudic days was the predominant method of instruction when teaching the alphabet in the elementary school.

Many of the rabbis used demonstrations before their students. R. Johanan during a lecture bit off his fingernails and threw them away in order to demonstrate that nail cutting was forbidden but nail biting was permitted during a festival week. R. Akiba, on a Friday fast-day had a roasted egg brought to him in the afternoon and ate the egg in front of his students, to demonstrate that a fast before the Sabbath must ended before the Sabbath begins.

The demonstrations indicate that a few of the rabbis were aware of the value of demonstration material as a means of stimulating attention, but nowhere was this stated as a halachah for all lecturers to follow.

Humor was frequently used as an attention-getter, although it was severely criticized by a few authorities. R. Zera held that laughter was prohibited. R. Akiba pronounced a curse on one of his students for stimulating laughter during a disputation. On the other hand, many of the important authorities advocated the use of humor. Judah Ha-Nasi, who suffered from melancholia, had one of his students juggle before him to stimulate the audience before he began his lectures. Rab Judah held that serious study must be preceded by "light hearted conversation." Rab and Rabbah both were described as "...saying something humorous to his students before he commenced his discourse, in order to amuse them; after that he sat in awe and commenced the lecture." Rab poked fun at himself in another example of a humorous introduction. He told how, whenever he told his wife to prepare lentils, she made peas, and when he asked for peas, he got lentils. Rab's son, Hiyya, began to convey the orders in reverse, and Rab got the right food. he remarked to his son, "your mother has improved," and concludes the story with a beginning for the lecture, "thine own offspring teaches thee reason." Other rabbis, following the example of Rab, told humorous stories before beginning their lectures. R. Joshua related the story of his disputation in puns with various persons. R. Johanan related the story of how he bested a female doctor in an exchange of wits. R. Johanan was also fond of poking fun at the institution of marriage, expressing amazement at how a married scholar could study "...with a millstone around the neck." The story of 'Ulla in Babylon is frequently used to commence a lecture;

'Ulla chanced to be in Babylon, and observing that a basketful of dates was being sold for a zuz, he exclaimed, 'A basketful of honey for a zuz and yet the Babylonians do not occupy themselves with the study of the Torah.' [The cost was so low that the Babylonians don't have to worry about working, and can devote all their time to the study of Torah.] During the night, he was in agony [due to overeating the inexpensive dates] and he then exclaimed, 'A basketful of knives for a zuz and yet the Babylonians occupy themselves with the study of Torah.'

It appears that free license was allowed in these humorous stories. Although it is not characteristic of Talmudic humor, even the "bedroom" story is used as humor;

It has been taught: R. Akiba said: 'Once I went in after R. Joshua to a privy and I learnt from him three things. I learnt that one does not sit east and west, but north and south. I learnt that one evacuates not standing but sitting, and I learnt that it is proper to wipe with the left hand, not the right...' Said Ben Azzai to him: 'Did you take such liberties with your Master?' He replied: 'It was a matter of Torah and I required to learn.' R. Kahana once went in and hid under Rab's bed. he heard him chatting with his wife and joking and doing what he required. He said to him: 'One would think that Abba's [Rab's real name] mouth had never sipped the dish before.' He said to him; 'Kahana, are you here? Go out, because it is rude.' He replied: 'It is a matter of Torah and I require to learn.'

In disputations, many of the rabbis used reductio ad absurdum to stimulate attention. R. Twiya ended a debate on the law of damages which had become very detailed, by asking what the law would be if a cow with a toothache uncovered the beer and drank it and it then caused damage. R. Eleazar asked if it was all right to stab an ignoramus on the day of atonement, and was told that it was not, since it would necessitate ritual slaughter which was prohibited on that day.

A typical example of Talmudic humor was the anonymous introduction used by an Amora;

Ten kabs of wisdom descended to the world; nine were taken by Palestine and one by the rest of the world. Ten kabs of beauty descended to the world; nine were taken by Jerusalem and one by the rest of the world. Ten kabs of wealth descended to the world; nine were taken by the Romans and one by the rest of the world. ...Ten kabs of gossip descended to the world; nine were taken by the women and one by the rest of the world. ...Ten kabs of sleep descended on the world; nine were taken by slaves and one by the rest of the world.

Although there was no concept of the use of emotions in proof presented in the Talmud, much emotional material appeared in the lectures and debates. Some of this resulted from spontaneous emotion. The bulk of the use of emotional material was conscious and designed to catch the lagging attention of the listeners at the Academy.

Those who attend regularly are classified into four categories typified by "...a sponge, a funnel, a strainer and a sieve." The sponge is the man who absorbs everything he hears without discrimination; the funnel is the man who takes in knowledge and lets it escape as soon as he gets it; the strainer is the man who retains the least useful information and lets the best get away; the sieve is the man who retains the best information and discards the inferior. No advice is given to the speaker on how to appeal to them.

Another passage gives a description of the good student as a speaker and as a listener;

There are seven things characteristic in a man of imperfectly developed mind, and seven in a wise man. A wise man speaks not before one whose wisdom is greater, and enters not into the midst of the words of his fellows; and is not hasty to answer: He asks in accordance with the subject matter, and he answers in accordance with the accepted decisions; And he speaks of the first point first and the last point last; And he acknowledges the truth; And concerning that which he has not heard, he says, 'I have not heard it:' And the reverse of these are characteristic in a man of imperfectly developed mind.

Another passage classified types of character in men;

There are four types of character in men: He that says: 'Mine is mine and thine is thine:' This is neutral type...of character. He that says, 'Mine is thine and thine is mine.' is an unlearned person: He that says, 'Mine is thine and thine is thine,' is a pious man: He that says, 'Mine is mine and thine is mine,' is a wicked man.

There are four types of character in respect of temperaments: Easy to become angry and easy to be pacified...Hard to become angry and hard to be pacified...Hard to become angry and easy to be pacified: He is a pious man: Easy to become angry and hard to be pacified: He is a wicked man.

These statements indicate some general analysis of character. There is no evidence that any attempt was made to apply these analyses to their speaking. Their concept of the audience apparently makes the audience responsible for listening, and thus relieves much of the burden of the speaker. The member of the audience is given advice on how to become a good listener, while little advice is given to the speaker on how to make the audience attentive.

A few of the lecturing rabbis made rudimentary analyses of specific speaking situations. Raba, for example, made the assumption that a person who attends the Academy consistently and jeopardizes his personal gain in so doing, is an interested person and entitled to good lectures. Rabbah analyzed the speech given by Joshua after the death of Moses and pointed out that the reason that the Israelites did not listen to him was because he had no children and would, therefore, have no stake in the new land. An anonymous lecturer indicated that in speaking to repentant sinners, no mention should be made of their past deeds for fear of insulting them; when speaking to proselytes, no reference should be made to their ancestors for fear of angering them; and, in general, to avoid the use of epithets when speaking to anyone. Raba described his experiences in lecturing to proselytes, indicating that when he spoke of the prohibitions applying to proselytes, they did not listen, but when he spoke of the privileges, they listened attentively.

Samuel preferred the direct approach. He recognized that, on occasion, the students at the Academy did not listen, and he gave the lecturer the privilege of rebuking that type of student. The teacher of Hillel, Abtalion, pointed out that rabbis who spoke to audiences of non-Hebrews should, "be careful with your words," for fear of saying anything which could be misconstrued. Rab simplified the reasons for his laws when he spoke at the kallah, so that the uninstructed members of the audience could understand him. Rab also chose his meturgeman with care, since he felt that the meturgeman had more appeal to the listeners than the lecturing rabbi. Johanan b. Zakkai displayed some concern about audiences when he discussed a lecture which he had to give to the tradesmen of town about alleged sharp practices, indicating how he was caught on the horns of a dilemma;

...Concerning all these [sharp practices]...Woe to me if I should speak of them: woe to me if I should not speak. Should I speak of them, Knaves might learn them: and should I not speak, the knaves might say, 'the scholars are unacquainted with our practices,' and will deceive us still more.

...Those people are like posts, and their hats are as long as themselves. Their voice comes from their boots, and their names are outlandish...If they give the order to arrest, you are arrested; to kill and you are killed..' have these men,' asked R. Jose, 'Influence with the government?' 'Yes,' he replied. 'Have they a retinue mounted on horses and mules?' 'Yes,' 'If that is so,' he said, 'you acted rightly.'

One of the haggadic disputations between R. Joshua b. Hanania and the sages of Athens has R. Joshua musing about his greeting to the sages. He felt that if he greeted the old men, the young men would kill him, and if he greeted the young men, the old men would kill him. He finally opened his speech by saying, "peace to you." The session at which R. Gamaliel was deposed also shows a form of analysis. One of the reasons given for his deposition was his failure to understand the monetary problems of his generation, and his failure of recognize, in his lectures, the poverty of his listeners.

While there are many scattered references to audience analysis in the Talmud, there is no explicit theory of audience analysis which is applicable over- all. Some of the authorities apparently took note of the audience situation and attempted to adapt to it. Whether the others did so cannot be determined, for they said nothing about it, and the reactions of their listeners are not recorded.

The rabbis seem to stress the idea that teaching and lecturing should be done in an orderly fashion, but no methodology for achieving order is given. Four separate passage speak of arrangement of learning, or indicate that the teaching followed "...a certain order," but no further details are given. An examination of the lectures given in the Academies indicates that the lecture probably began with a statement of the halachah, followed by the Biblical reference for it. this was followed by specific examples, or some sort of proof and justification for the halachah. It appears that the lectures rarely had conclusions because of the intervening disputation.

There was some order in disputation. Disputants avoided asking questions about material not under discussion, and in cases where questions of this type were asked, the questioner was severely criticized. Certain of the authorities reserved the right to finish the explanation of the halachah before allowing disputation, and their students accorded to their wishes. In debates between equals, it was considered good form to allow each participant to finish his statement before answering. It was also considered proper to allow the speaker to answer a question completely, before asking another. Several admonitions were given to students to be moderate in their disagreements. They were told not to argue for the sake of argument, but to consider before speaking and to ask for reasons for conclusions before questioning conclusions.

The order followed in disputation seemed to arise from politeness or protocol, rather than from a conscious desire for order in a speech. The few rules of order which were applied to disputation seem to arise from the awareness of the disputants that a certain amount of time was needed by each speaker, and simple decency required that the opponent allow this time.

Some specific views are presented about introductions to lectures. It has already been indicated that a number of the rabbis began their lectures by saying something humorous. R. Hanina indicated that is was considered impolite to begin to speak until the audience had been called to attention and a formal announcement was made that the lecture was about to begin. Raba felt that the actual beginning of the speech should be serious, but that humor was effective first, since it put the students in the mood to become serious. It is possible that some of the rabbis followed the example of Hillel, who began his lectures by "...rebuking them with words."

One talmudic passage presents the introductions by various rabbis to discourses on a Bible passage. These introductions suggest that after the preliminaries to the speech, the rabbis began by stating either a Mishnah or a Biblical verse as an introduction. In some cases, both Bible and Mishnah were used, the Mishnah being used to illustrate the law stated in the Bible.

The function of the meturgeman indicates that some order was used in the speech proper. The Meturgeman was provided with the "heads of the discourse" by the lecturing rabbi, which implies that the lecturer had given some thought to the arrangement of these heads. No further indication is given as to the specific method of arrangement in the body of the speech.

Only one passage can be found in the Talmud which may be construed as dealing with conclusions to a speech. R. Mari stated that since the prophets closed their speeches with, "words of praise and comfort," the rabbis ought to use this method in closing their lectures.

In general, the rabbis were apparently aware of the need for an introduction and a body and a conclusion of some sort, but there was no general agreement on the principles for organizing the speech as a whole, nor any of the parts of the speech.

These passages imply that not only profanity, but insult and slander, intentional or unintentional, must be eliminated from speech. One of the criticisms leveled against the Babylonians by the Palestinians was they injured each other's feelings in disputation. Abaye, himself a Babylonian, stated that a rabbi should never answer back more than his colleague has spoken. In other words, he should neither take excess time, nor indulge in insult.

Some figures and tropes were used in the Academic lectures and disputations. Several authorities advocated the frequent use of metaphor. Raba praised the book of Ecclesiastics for its excellent use of simile. Hyperbole is justified on the basis that Scripture uses it frequently. It has already been indicated that various types of humor were used by many of the rabbis. Many other examples of figures and tropes could be cited, but actually, in Academic speaking, their use is limited, while Midrash abounds in their use. Some authorities made use of parables and fables. R. Meir was praised because of the number of fables he knew and the way he used them in his lectures. Some authorities invented their own fables, but this was condemned on the grounds that hypothetical cases were invalid in reasoning. The rabbis frequently indulged their wit in what was known as enigmatic speech. This consisted of breaking long words into their components and inventing puns based on the components.

There is no explicit statement of the optimum style of an Academic lecture. From the isolated statements in the Talmud pertaining to style and from the lectures, themselves, it is possible to extract the picture of the ideal rabbinic lecturer. The Ideal speaker had to have memorized the Bible, Mishnah, Midrash and Gemara, and it was desirable for him to know Baraita and the other related works. He had to be able to quote exactly from his sources. The ideal speaker had to be able to discuss halachah and express his views without obscurity and be able to counter any arguments raised against his point of view as soon as they were raised. He was to be able to speak any time, to anyone and be able to express his point of view, directly, without specious issues or digressions. The knowledge possessed by the speaker was the basis of his style. His effectiveness was based on his knowledge, and consequently, simplicity and directness were better suited to his speech occasions which were largely devoted to communicating his knowledge. The rabbis had ample opportunity to indulge in more florid speaking in the synagogue, but restraint was the keynote of speech in the Academy.

R. Akiba felt that even more repetition should be used if the pupil did not master the lesson in four tries. The repetition was to be in small doses, and the material was to be thoroughly memorized before new material was introduced. According to Raba, "If a man studies much at a time, his learning decreases." A group of authorities held that material was not fully memorized until it had been repeated at least 400 times. In addition, the student must have the assistance of God. R. Eleazar held that the student must be of good character, pleasant, conciliatory, and out of the public eye, if he was to memorize effectively through repetition. Resh Lakish held that the repetition must be organized; the teacher should present material according to a system, and the student should frequently systematize his material. R. Johanan felt that the material to be memorized should be repeated by chanting to a tune, so that the tune would serve as a memory prop. There appeared to be universal agreement that repetition was essential to memorization.

In addition to memorization, mnemotechnical aids were provided to help the student acquire material. These aids existed in one of three forms. One method selected the key words of a passage and cited them as memory jogs to the whole passage. For example;

[mnemonic] Hekkesh and gezerah shawah; Kal washomer. It is agreed that which is learnt through a hekkesh does it not in turn teach through a hekkesh.

The passage goes on to explain the use of the three hermeneutic principles in exegesis. The mnemonic aids were added to early material by later authorities in order to aid in memorization.

The second method of mnemonics is samakta. This involves the citing of a short Scriptural passage following an involved statement. The Scriptural passage was to serve as a guide to the material preceding as it was an illustrative example of the conclusion reached.

The most frequent mnemonic method was that of notarikon. This was a combination of letters taken from key-words in a passage and formed into another word which served as a memory jog. For example;

...It may be learned...in respect of MiKDaSH [holiness.] [The word MiKDaSH is made up of the initial letters of Mahshabeth - intention; Karath - a part or portion; Dam - blood; Shelish - third.
i. When a sacrifice is made out of bounds or after time, it is invalidated by INTENTION.
ii. In both cases, the illegitimate intention, even in respect of a PART or PORTION...disqualifies it.
iii. Both disqualify only if expressed during the service in connection with the sprinkling of BLOOD...
iv. The THIRD day is mentioned in connection with both in order to provide an analogy between the two cases.]

Thus, the statement of the key-word, MiKDaSH, should recall the whole passage to the mind of the student.

There is nothing to the Talmud to indicate that the rabbis were required to memorize their lectures, and nothing seems to indicate that they did. The extempore character of most Academic speaking would tend to preclude this. However, all of the material upon which lectures and disputations were based was committed to memory, and thus a strong memory was of critical importance to the lecturer. The theory of memory is probably the only explicit statement in the Talmud on any division of rhetoric.

A number of questions raised by this study provide a fertile field for future research;

1. Was there any contact between the Greek and Roman system of rhetoric and the Talmudic education system? If so, what influence did this contact have, and on whom?

2. What influence did the later development of the hermeneutic rules into a logical system have upon Jewish rhetoric?

3. What are the essential features of the legal and homiletic speaking of this period? Was there any theory, implicit or explicit that applied to these that differed from that applied to educational speaking?

These questions seem to indicate that the Jewish culture provides a field for future research in the history of rhetoric. With the new translations of source material and the general availability of good courses in Hebrew, the challenge is presented to investigate this field with an eye toward ascertaining its effect upon the development of western rhetorical theory.

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________. Midrash and Mishnah. New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1916.

________. "Pilpul," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. X, 1909.

________. "Raba (b. Josheph b. Hama)," Jewish Encyclopedia,Vol. X, 1909.

________. "Rabbah b. Bar Hana," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. X, 1909.

________. "Rabbah b. Nahmani," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. X, 1909.

________. Rabbinic Essays. Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1951.

________. "Samuel Yarhina'ah," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. XI, 1909.

________. "Sanhedrin," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. XI, 1909.

________. "The Seven Rules of Rules of Hillel," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. X, 1909.

________. "Sheshet," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. XI, 1909.

________. "Simeon b. Eleazar," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. XI, 1909.

Lauterbach, Jacob Zallel. "Simeon (b. Gamaliel II)," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. XI, 1909.

________. "Simeon b. Lakish," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. XI, 1909.

________. "Talmud Hermeneutics," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, 1909.

________. "The Thirteen Rules of Eliezer b. Jose Ha-Galili," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. X, 1909.

Levias, Caspar, "Gematria," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. V, 1909.

________. "Hebrew Language," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, 1909.

Liber, Maurice. Rashi. Translated by Adele Szold. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1906.

Margolis, Max L. and Marx, Alexander. A History of the Jewish People. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publications Society of America, 1953.

Mendelsohn, S. The Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews. Baltimore: M. Curlander, 1891.

________. "Eleazar b. Azariah," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. V, 1909.

________. "Eliczer b. Hyrcanus," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. V, 1909.

________. "Eliezer b. Jose Ha-Galili," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. V, 1909.

________. "Haber," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, 1909.

________. "Hananiah (Hanina)," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, 1909.

________. "Hanina b. Dosa," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, 1909.

________. "Hanina b. Hama," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, 1909.

________. "Ishmael b. Elisha," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, 1909.

________. "Johanan b. Nappaha," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. VII, 1909.

Mielziner, Moses, "Amora," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. I, 1909.

________. Introduction to the Talmud. New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1925.

Moore, George Foot. Judaism. 3 Vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1944.

Morris, Nathan. The Jewish School. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1937.

Philipson, David. "Homiletics," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, 1909.

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria. 8 Vols. Translated by H. E. Butler. London: William Heinemann, 1920-22.

Raisin, Jacob S. Gentile Reactions to Jewish Ideals. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953.

Roth, Cecil. A Short History of the Jewish People. London: East and West Library, 1940.

Sachar, Abraham. A History of the Jews. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1940.

Schechter, Solomon. "On the Study of the Talmud," Studies in Judaism. Third Series. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1924.

________. "The Talmud," Studies in Judaism. Third Series. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1924.

Seligsohn, Max, "Huna," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, 1909.

________. "Simeon b. Yohai," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, 1909.

Stern, Nathan. "Hiyya bar Abba," Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, 1909.

Strack, Hermann L. Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1931.

Thonssen, Lester and Baird, A. Craig. Speech Criticism. New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1948.

Unterman, Isaac. The Talmud. New York: Record Press, 1952.

Weingreen, J. A Practical Grammar for Classical Hebrew. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1952.

Zeitlin, Solomon. "The Origin of the Synagogue," Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 1930-1931. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1931.

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See Cicero, de Oratore; Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory; Aristotle, Rhetoric.

Baldwin, op. cit., p. 43.
De Oratore, II, xxiv-1xxi.
See Baldwin, op. cit., ch. 1, 2, 3.
George Foot Moore, Judaism, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1944), I, 107.
See Baldwin, op. cit.; Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1948); Mabel Platz, The History of Public Speaking (New York: Noble and Noble, 1935) to mention only a few well-known works.
Zevi Hirsch Chajes, The Students Guide Through the Talmud (London: East and West Library, 1952), p. 262.
Julius Kaplan, The Redaction of the Babylonian Talmud (New York: Myold Printing Co., 1932) p. 28.
H. Graetz, A history of the Jews (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1891), II, 632
Ibid.
Louis Finklestein, "The Jewish Religion." The Jews (New York: Harper and Bros., 1949), II, 1331.
Chajes, op. cit., p. 266.
Rabbi Gerson Cohen, librarian of the Jewish theological Seminary of America indicated to the author in a letter dated September 14, 1955, "...use of the Soncino translation of the Talmud is an excellent idea. It is a very reliable translation done by eminent rabbinical scholars."
Strack, op. cit., pp. 3-5
Moses Mielziner, Introduction to the Talmud (New York: Bloch Publishing Co., Inc. 1925), p. 5.
Wilhelm Bacher, "Talmud", Jewish Encyclopedia (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1909), Vol. XII, p. 24. Hereafter the Jewish Encyclopedia is abbreviated JE.
Graetz, op. cit., p. 635.
Cohen, op. cit., p. 157
Solomon Schechter, "On The Study of the Talmud", Studies in Judaism, third series (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1924), pp. 145-151.
Bacher, op. cit., p. 24.
Schechter, op. cit., p. 151.
R. Travers Herford, The Pharisees (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1924), p. 75. Chajes, op. cit., p. 139.
Nathan Morris, The Jewish School (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1937), p. xxv.
Deut. 6:7
Louis Grossman, "Pedagogics," JE IX, 570
Morris, op. cit., pp. 40-41.
Max Margolis and Alexander Marx, A History of the Jewish People (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1953), p. 160.
M. Gudemann, "Education in Talmudical Times", JE, V, 43-8.
Kethuboth 105a, 673.
Kiddushin 66a, 334.
Babe Bathra 20b-21b, 105-8.
Graetz, op. cit., II, 50-51.
Judah Goldin, "The Period of the Talmud:, The Jews Vol. I, p. 130.
More, op. cit., p. 311.
R. Travers Herford, Talmud and Apocrypha (London: The Soncino Press, 1933), p. 106-7.
W. Bacher, "Academies in Palestine, JE I, 148.
Moore, op. cit., pp. 84-5.
Moore, op. cit., pp. 83-4
Goldin, op. cit., pp. 150-151.
Moore, op. cit., pp. 93-94.
Goldin, op. cit., p. 170.
Moore, op cit., p. 107.
Morris, op. cit., p. 20.
Lewis Dembitz, "Organization of the Community," JE IV, 197.
Baba Bathra 20b, 105.
Morris, op. cit., p. 44.
Shabbath 12a-b, 47.
Kethuboth 111b, 723.
Aboth, V, 21.
Nathan Draizin, History of Jewish Education (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1940), p. 14.
Morris, op. cit., p. 60.
Kethuboth 50a, 286-9.
Kiddushin 30a, 143-4.
Morris, op. cit., p. 67.
Kiddushin 82a, 421-2.
Baba Bathra 30b-21b, 105-8.
Abodah Zorah 15b, 78.
Bekeroth 46a, 313.
Hullin 107h, 595-6.
Morris, op. cit., 154-5.
Morris, op. cit., p. 87.
Ibid., p.73
Draizin, op. cit., p. 63.
Kiddushin 30b, 148.
Shabbath 104a, 500-501.
Morris, op. cit., p. 117.
Sukkah 28b, 126.
Yoma 82a, 402.
Pesahim 115b, 592.
Morris, op. cit., p. 141.
Ibid., p. 124.
Baba Bathra 20b-21b, 105-108.
Morris, op. cit., p. 119.
Graetz, op. cit., I, 396.
Moore, op. cit., p. 112.
Sanhedrin 99a-b, 671-3.
Michael Friedlander, The Jewish Religion (New York: Pardes Publishing House, Inc., 1946), p. 134.
Moore, op. cit., p. 254.
Yoma 28b, 133.
Nazir 23b, 84.
Kiddushin 40b, 202.
Sanhedrin 51b, 346.
Yoma 35b, 163-4.
Morris, op. cit., p. 20.
Yebamoth 105a, 724-5.
Baba Bathra 121b, 500.
Shabbath 119b, 590.
Ibid., 31a,141-2.
Makkoth 10a, 62-3.
Ta'anith 7a, 25-6.
Hagigah 5b, 25.
Bab Mezi'a 85a., 488-9.
Ibid.
Aboth IX, 5.
Ibid.
Yebamoth 62b, 417-8.
Sanhedrin 44b, 290.
Megillah 16b, 100-1.
Peah I, 1.
Nedarim 41a, 129-30.
Aboth VI, 1-2.
Draizin, op. cit., p. 58.
Aboth de Rabbi Nathan VI, 40.
Yebamoth 75a, 508.
Mo'ed Katan 16a, 99.
Shabbath 117a, 587.
Megillah 26b, 160.
Shabbath 66a, 313.
Goldin, op. cit., p. 177.
Erubin 65a, 453.
Ibid.
Draizin, op. cit., p. 63.
Bezah 24b, 126.
Sukkah 28b, 128.
Shabbath 129b, 647.
Graetz, op. cit., II, 547.
Horayoth 13b, 101.
J. Z. Lauterback, "Ordination," JE IX, 428-430.
Kethuboth 17a, 93.
Nedarim 49b, 153.
Megillah 21a, 129.
Hullin 86b, 485.
Rosh Hashanah 16b, 62.
Erubin 94a, 648.
Hagigah 3a, 8-9.
Pesahim 51b-52a, 251-2.
Arsene Darmesteter, The Talmud, trans. Henrietta Szold (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication ociety of America, 1897), p. 28.
Goldin, op. cit., p. 130.
Aboth I, 13-14.
Ibid., I, 1.
Aboth, I, 16.
Aboth de Rabbi Nathan, I, 15.
Aboth, I, 15.
Ta'anith 7a, 25.
Erubin 53a, 369.
Erubin 65b, 455.
Menahoth 92a, 560.
Ta'anith 7b, 84.
Shabbath 188b, 584.
Horayoth 13b, 100.
Pesahim 62b, 313.
Sotah 20a, 101.
Baba Kamma 38a, 214.
Ibid., 38a, 215.
Sanhedrin 59a, 400.
Yoma 71b, 339.
Bekoroth 30b-31a, 192-7
Ibid.
Aboth de Rabbi Nathan III, 26.
Sanhedrin 96a, 647.
Hullin 44b, 240.
Sotah 5a, 20.
Yoma 86a, 427.
Horayoth 13a, 97.
Kerithoth 28a, 218.
Bab Mezi'a 33a, 204.; Horayoth 13a, 99.
Bekoroth 19a, 114.
Menahoth 99a, 606.
Hullin 133a, 753.
Nedarim 62a, 198.
Shabbath 139a, 701.
Ibid., 114a, 558.
Kethuboth 20a, 110.
Shebu'oth 41a, 251.
Baba Bathra 8a, 32.
Kethuboth 11b, 720.
Ibid., 62b, 375.
Menahoth 71a, 419.
Tamid 27b, 9.
Shabbath 152a, 776. Berakoth 11b, 64.
Nega'im III, 12.
Rosh Hashanah 23a, 99.
Makkoth 5b, 25.
Bekoroth 29a, 185.
Kethuboth 105b, 676.
Berakoth 43b, 266.
Megillah 27b, 167.
Pesahim 113a, 580.
Moore, op. cit., p. 319.
Nedarim 35b, 106.
Baba Bathra 134a, 563.
Moore, op. cit., III, p. 77.
Aboth III, 18.
Baba Kamma 30a, 161.
Menahoth 110a, 679.
Shabbath 31a, 141.
Abodah Zarah 19a, 97.
Aboth de Rabbi Nathan VIII, 49.
Ta'anith 24a, 125.
Megillah 2b, 8.
Sabbath 77a, 365.
Megillah 3a, 9.
Shabbath 11a, 40.
Pesahim 50a, 239.
Erubin 26a, 179.
Erubin 13b, 85.
Abodah Zarah 43b, 216.
Aboth III, 8.
Rosh Hashanah 24a, 103.
Sukkah 51b, 242.
Hagigah 11b, 61.
Hullin 9a, 37.
Josh. 1:8.
Menahoth 99b, 609.
Sotah 49b, 268.
Shabbath 116a, 569.
Hagigah 14a, 83.
Herford, Talmud and Apocrypha, p. 56-7.
Gittin 60b, 284.
Bab Mezi'a 84a, 479; Erubin 53a, 371.
Kiddushin 30a, 144.
Hullin 4b, 15.
Ibid.
Ibid., 89a, 498.
Aboth I, 15.
Sotah 35a, 171.
Temurah 14a, 97.
Sotah 20a, 102.
Strack, op. cit., p. 13.
Sotah 20a, 102.
Gittin 60a, 281.
Moore, op. cit., I, 112.
Lauterbach, "Oral Law," JE, IX, 423.
Temurah 15b, 107.
Aboth de Rabbi Nathan, VIII, 50.
Sanhedrin 106b, 727.
Baba Bathra 9b, 44.
Sanhedrin 38b, 245.
Hullin 43b, 234.
Deut. 30:12.
Exod. 23:2.
Baba Mezi'a 59b, 352-6.
Strack, op. cit., p. 89.
Darmesteter, op. cit., p. 29.
Strack, op. cit., p. 89.
Herford, Talmud and Apocrypha, 109.
Draizin, op. cit., p. 58.
Shabbath 31a, 140-41.
Ta'anith 7a, 25.
Baba Kamma 60b, 350.
Berakoth 27b-28a, 166-170.
Gittin 82a, 397; Berakoth 63b, 399.
Graetz, op. cit., II, 361.
Yebamoth 96b, 660.
Ta'anith 20a, 100.
Baba Mezi'a 84b, 482.
Baba Kamma 20a, 99; Kiddushin 44a, 221; 25a, 119.
Baba Mezi'a 64a, 379; Berakoth 28b 240; Baba Kamma 117a, 698.
Nazir 59b, 222; Zebahim 13a, 64.
Kiddushin 70a, 354-7.
Gittin 73a, 347.
Pesahim 30a, 137.
Baba Kamma 116b, 695.
Menahoth 42a, 252.
Shabbath 47a, 214.
Baba Bathra 152b, 661.
Berakoth 63b, 400.
Ibid., 47b, 289.
Aboth de Rabbi Nathan, VIII, 50.
Aboth I, 6.
Shabbath 11a, 40.
Hagigah 12a, 67; Kerithoth 8a, 58.
Abodah Zarah 44b, 220; 54b, 279.
Sabbath 88a, 419.
Sanhedrin 38b, 244. Epicurean was the term applied to all non-Jewish philosophers.
Sanhedrin 38b, 244; Baba Bathra 10a, 45.
Sanhedrin 38b, 245.
Pesahim 30a, 137.
Erubin 29a, 198.
Sanhedrin 38b, 246; Hullin 100a, 555; Shabbath 126b, 627; Kiddushin 31a, 150.
Chajes, op. cit., p. 166. For a good example of rabinnic homiletics see David Philipson, JE, VI, 454-457.
Bacher, "Academies in Babylon", op. cit., p. 35.
Ibid.
Erubin 27a, 184-5.
Graetz, op. cit., II, 514.
Bacher, "Academies in Babylon," op. cit., p. 146.
Yebamoth 122a, 862.
Graetz, op. cit., II, 514.
Ta'anith 6b, 23.
Berakoth 49a, 300.
Berakoth 6a, 23.
Ibid., 6b, 27.
Sukkah 26a, 113; Baba Kamma 113a, 662.
Nedarim 23b, 68.; Menahoth 40a, 241.
Moore, op. cit., I, 112.
Kauffman Kohler, "Rabbinical Authority", JE, II, 338.
Graetz, op. cit., II, 574.
Baba Mezi'a 84b, 482.
Erubin 53a, 369.
Abodah Zarah 6b, 16; 16b, 83; Sukkah 11a, 43.
Yoma 87a, 436.
Shabbath 3a, 5.
Baba Kamma 60b, 350.
Ta'anith 7a, 25.
Shabbath 38a, 175.
Moe'ed Katan 5a, 24; me'ilah 5a, 12.
Pesahim 110a, 566.
Baba Bathra 8b, 36.
Berakoth 2a, 35.
Baba Kamma 117a, 698.
Shabbath 30a, 131.
Baba Bathra 51a, 210.
Sanhedrin 38b, 244.
Shabbath 154a, 787.
Rosh Hashanah 19b, 80.
Kethubooh 53a, 312.
Berakoth 7a, 31.
Rosh Hashanah 17b, 70.
Erubin 21b, 150.
Ibid., 100b, 696.
Baba Bathra 10a, 47.
Shabbath 88a, 417.
Yoma 35b, 163.
Megillah 3b, 3.
Abodah Zarah 54b, 279.
Hullin 27b, 141.
I Cor., 14:16, 23-24.
Shabbath 80b, 383.
Niddah 36a, 250.
Graetz, op. cit., II, 162.
Berakoth 27b, 166.
Kethuboth 57a, 336.
Sanhedrin 6b, 23.
Exod. 23:7.
Shebu'oth 31a, 171.
Megillah 32a, 194.
Ta'anith 8a, 32.
Shabbath 63a, 296.
Yebamoth 40a, 258.
Gittin 606, 285.
Edduyoth I, 5-6.
Mo'ed Katan 36, 13.
Pesahim 70b, 360.
Moses Mielziner, "Amora," JE I, 527.
Chajes, op. cit., p. 85.
Pesahim 117a, 599.
Kiddushin 39b, 195, Hullin 142a, 824.
Hagigah 14a, 84.
Yoma 20b, 89.
Hagigah 96a, 103.
Gittin 60a, 281.
Shabbath 88a, 416.
Baba Bathra 73a, 303.
Mo'ed Katan 24b, 153.
Erubin 16b, 113.
Hullin 100a, 555; Ta'anith 8a, 32; Gittin 43a, 186; Sanhedrin 44a, 288; Zebahim 94b, 456.
Yoma 48b, 228.
Pesahim 50b, 256.
Berakoth 30z, 183.
Ta'anith 4b, 12.
Mo'ed Katan 21a, 133.
Kethuboth 8b, 38.
Sanhedrin 34a, 214.
Bezah 4a, 13; Kerithoth 13b, 102.
Berakoth 27b, 166.
Hullin 15a, 71.
Graetz, op. cit., II, 540-41.
Schechter, op. cit., p. 145.
Hagigah 3b, 9.
Mielziner, op. cit., p. 261.
Baba Kamma 40a, 225.
Kiddushin 20a, 92. Ben Azzai was a scholar of the Tannaitic period who used to challenge all comers to open debate.
Erubin 29a, 198.
Baba Mezi'a 84a, 479.
Ta'anith 9a, 39.
Yoma 73a, 350.
Kethuboth 90b, 577; Erubin 92a, 639.
Mielziner, op. cit., p. 262.
Hullin 75b, 416.
Kiddushin 44a, 221.
Yebamoth 96b, 660.
Ibid., 105b, 726.
Berakoth 39b, 240.
Baba Bathra 111a, 460.
Baba Mezi'a 20a, 125.
Yoma 48b, 228.
Erubin 43a, 497.
Berakoth 27b, 167.
Hullin 51a, 275.
Niddah 14b, 95.
Kethuboth 69a, 426.
Baba Bathra 115b, 475.
Ibid., 52a, 214.
Baba Kamma 40a, 225.
Baba Mezi'a 11,a, 62.
Gittin 32b, 133.
Shabbath 11a, 40.
Pesahim 105a, 552.
Shabbath 60a, 281.
Baba Mezi'a 84a, 479.
Ibid., 16a, 95.
Yebamoth 96b, 660.
Abodah Zarah 6b, 29.
Niddah 22b, 151.
Berakoth 62b, 394.
Gittin 82a, 394.
Niddah 4b, 20.
Kerithoth 27a, 205.
Zebahim 5a, 18.
Me'ilah 7a, 20.
Zebahim 41b, 207; 52b, 263; 65b, 323.
James H. McBurney and Kenneth Hance, discussion in Human Affairs (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950). See also Russell H. Wagner and Carroll C. Arnold, Handbook of Group Discussion (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1950).
Mielziner, op. cit., pp. 233-6.
Erubin 65b, 455.
Erubin 32b, 224; Pesahim 35a, 162; Sabbath 145b, 736.
Yebamoth 102b, 706.
Tamid 32a, 26.
Bekototh 8b, 51.
Baba Bathra 23b, 188.
Menahoth 37a, 228.
Berakoth 63b, 402.
Erubin 67a, 466.
Erubin 13b, 85.
Niddah 45a, 311.
Hagigah 14a, 84; Kiddushin 30a, 144.
Hullin 11a, 47.
Temurah 15b, 107.
Sanhedrin 88b, 585.
Temurah 7a, 40; Yebamoth 92b, 631; Yadayim IV, 1.
Shabbath 17a, 70.
Sanhedrin 36a, 226.
Berakoth 37a, 233.
Baba Bathra 23b, 117.
Kethboth 21a, 116.
Bezah 11a, 53.
Bekoroth 37a, 236.
Yebamoth 14a, 72.
Rosh Hashanah 14a, 52.
Gittin 41a, 175.
Edduyoth V, 7.
Ibid., V, 6.
Ibid., I, 5.
Hullin 11b, 52.
Abodah Zarah 36a, 175.
Aboth IV, 8.
Sanhedrin 59b, 402.
Edduyoth I, 6.
Shabbath 39b, 184.
Pesahim 21a, 92.
Baba Bathra 52a, 214.
Gittin 15b, 57.
Berakoth 35b, 222.
See Thonssen and Baird, op. cit., p. 79. See also Quintilian, institutes of Oratory, x, xi, where he is concerned with appropriateness of material for the audience.
Schechter, op. cit., p. 154.
Kiddushin 30a, 144.
Aboth V, 22.
Herford, The Pharisees, p. 73.
Baba Bathra 12a, 59.
Sanhedrin 42a, 272.
Strack, op. cit., p. 21. Compare also Quintilian's collect notebooks of ideas and words (copia rerum and copia verborm) as side in invention.
Louis Ginzberg, "Codification of Law," JE, VII, 639.
Baba Mezi'a 104a, 594.
Erubin 22a, 150.
Ibid.
Menahoth 29b, 190.
Sanhedrin 106b, 727.
Abodah Zarah 42b, 211.
Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1,2. See also Thonssen and Baird, op. cit., p. 61.
Moore, op. cit., I, 248.
Hagigah 10a, 50.
Baba Bathra 111b, 462.
Niddah 25a, 170.
Sotah 16a, 83.
Yoma 76a, 369.
Gittin 73a, 347.
Shabbath 60b, 284.
Zebahim 5a, 18.
Hullin 76b, 427.
Yebamoth 45a, 292.
Erubin 60a, 421.
Niddah 24b, 167.
Nedarim 81a, 253.
Aboth I, 13.
Kethuboth 83b, 528.
Zebahim 48a, 239.
Kerithoth 15b, 118.
Yadayim III, 2.
Niddah 7b, 45.
Rosh Hashanah 31b, 151.
Chajes, op. cit., p. 79.
Kethuboth 40a, 223.
Hullin 141a, 818.
Gittin 6b, 20.
Yebamoth 55b, 373.
Berakoth 33b, 208.
Kethuboth 53a, 312.
Sukkah 28a, 122.
Berakoth 38b, 240.
Niddah 14b, 95.
Sanhedrin 36a, 228.
Zebahim 96b, 461.
Sanhedrin 30b, 187.
Yebamoth 40b, 276; Niddah 49a, 340.
Yebamoth 40b, 276.
Edduyoth I, 5.
Hullin 44b, 238.
Megillah 2a, 2.
Nedarim 8b, 19.
Abodah Zarah 16b, 83.
Hullin 7a, 27.
Bekoroth 5a, 23.
Shabbath 15a, 61.
Kiddushin 31b, 154.
Sukkah 27b, 121.
Yoma 73a, 350.
Sukkah 11a, 43.
Kethuboth 57a, 336.
Yebamoth 16a, 85.
Baba Bathra 130b, 544.
Yebamoth 58a, 389; Erubin 46a, 318.
Sanhedrin 17b, 88.
Horayoth 13b, 102.
Sanhedrin 86a, 566.
Erubin 13a, 80.
Berakoth 26b, 161.
Kethuboth 100a, 634.
Yadayim IV, 3.
Kiddushin 39a, 189.
Bezah 5a, 17.
Ibid., 27a, 137.
Erubin 46b, 323.
Ibid.
Ibid., 47b, 327.
Ibid., 46b, 323.
Ibid., 47b, 332.
Ibid., 47a, 326.
Shabbath 21b, 91.
Hullin 77a, 427.
Erubin 46b, 324.
Sanhedrin 36a, 337.
Berakoth 51b, 311.
Yebamoth 9a, 43.
Erubin 13b, 85.
Pesahim 66a, 333.
Erubin 46a, 318.
Kerithoth 15b, 118.
Horayoth 13b, 102; Gittin 67a, 317.
Pesahim 105a, 550.
Baba Bathra 52a, 214.
Baba Kamma 6b, 21.
Yadayim IV, 3.
Hullin 10b, 46.
Baba Bathra 5a, 18.
Baba Kamma 37a, 209.
Kethuboth 43b, 246.
Kerithoth 11b, 88.
Gittin 30a, 125.
Erubin 91a, 630.
Menahoth 59b, 353.
Hullin 11b, 52.
Shabbath 126b, 627.
Sanhedrin 40a, 255.
Hullin 57b, 315.
Ibid., 58b, 320.
Ibid., 54a, 294.
Ibid., 57a, 312.
Nazir 39a, 142.
Baba Mezi'a 83a, 477.
Rosh Hashanah 24b, 107.
Shabbath 151b, 773.
Ibid., 32a, 146.
Menahoth 55a, 328.
Sanhedrin 71a, 483.
Baba Kamma 116b, 695; Baba Bathra 130b, 544.
Lewis Dembitz, "Evidence," JE V, 277.
Gittin 19b, 73.
Sanhedrin 40a, 255.
Abodah Zarah 8a, 37.
Isaac Broyde, "Logic," JE VIII, 151.
Mielziner, op. cit., p. 118.
Jacob Lauterbach, Midrash and Mishnah (New York: Bloch Publishing Company, 1916), p. 61.
Bacher, "Talmud," op. cit., p. 2.
Mielziner, op. cit., p. 118.
Graetz, op. cit., II, 98.
Jacob Lauterbach, "Sadduccees and Pharisees," Rabbinic Essays, (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1951), p. 31.
Louis Ginzberg, "Baraita of the Thirty-Two Rules," JE, II, 251.
Darmesteter, op. cit., p. 32.
Mielziner, op. cit., p. 177. Mielziner does not regard these rules as a logical system. He feels their function is to provide understanding of the Bible text.
Ibid.
Zebahim 3b, 10.
Zebahim 17b, 89.
Zebahim 48a, 240.
Mielziner, op. cit., p. 183.
See Sukkah 50b, 236; Nazir 34b, 129 for good examples of this type of reasoning. These passages also illustrate the dispute between those who believe in reasoning based on arbitrary rules, and those who uphold logic.
Erubin 51a, 353.
Baba Mezi'a 94b, 545.
Sanhedrin 35b, 225.
Berakoth 32b, 202.
Deut. 21:5.
Niddah 50a, 344.
Sanhedrin 86a, 569; Hullin 63a, 342; 115b, 633.
Kerithoth 4b, 24.
Kiddushin 7a, 76.
Zebahim 41a, 205; Menahoth 78a, 465; Nedarim 3a, 4.
Erubin 41a, 282.
Erubin 54a, 377.
Aboth III, 17.
Baba Mezi'a 84a, 479.
Hullin 92a, 514.
Ta'anith 21a, 104.
Ibid., 7a, 26.
Yoma 22b, 102.
Hagigah 14a, 84.
Shabbath 63a, 296.
Erubin 67a, 466.
Baba Mezi'a 23b, 28.
Berakoth 51b, 311.
Ibid., 11a, 62; Yebamoth 9a, 43.
Erubin 13b, 85.
Shabbath 30b, 138.
Shabbath 31a, 139.
See Aboth I, 13 for an example of Hillel ethical maxims.
Baba Bathra 9a, 42.
Ibid., 107b, 447.
Zebahim 44a, 223.
Ibid., 70b, 345.
Yebamoth 91a, 619.
Sukkah 32b, 142.
Shabbath 95a, 454.
Zebahim 77a, 368.
Pesahim 88a, 467.
Yebamoth 75b, 511.
Kerithoth 8a, 58.
Menahoth 52a, 314; Yoma 57a, 267.
Erubin 54b, 383.
Ta'anith 7b, 30; Pesahim 117a, 600.
Kerithoth 6a, 38; Horayoth 12a, 87.
Shabbath 145b, 736; Pesahim 35a, 162.
Yoma 18b, 80.
Chajes, op. cit., p. 195.
Ibid., p.175.
Erubin 21b, 150.
Kiddushin 70a, 354.
Yebamoth 97b, 666. In attempting to reason out how these could come about, it must be remembered that multiple marriage was permitted in Talmudic days. Only the last situation was possible without committing incest.
Tamid 29a, 14.
Shabbath 88a, 417.
Baba Mezi'a 84b, 482.
Aboth de Rabbi Nathan XV, 80; Shabbath 31a, 139.
Shabbath 104a, 500.
Mo'ed Katan 18a, 113.
Erubin 41a, 282.
Menahoth 68b, 403.
Niddah 23a, 157.
Sukkah 53a, 254.
Shabbath 37b, 136.
Pesahim 117a, 600; Shabbath 129b, 647.
Yebamoth 63a, 402.
Shabbath 152a, 775.
Yoma 84a, 413.
Kiddushin 29b, 140.
Ta'anith 6b, 40; Pesahim 88a, 465.
Berakoth 62a, 388.
Baba Kamma 34b, 193.
Pesahim 49a, 234.
Kiddushin 49b, 248.
Sanhedrin 74b, 505.
See I Cor. 14:34 which describes Paul speaking in the synagogue according to this formula.
Berakoth 30a, 183.
Ibid., 6b, 27.
Pesahim 26b, 117.
Kinnim III, 6.
Aboth de Rabbi Nathan 40, 165.
Aboth V, 14.
Aboth V, 15.
Aboth V, 7.
Aboth V, 10-11.
Makkoth 10a, 63.
Sotah 35a, 171.
Baba Mezi'a 58b, 347.
Kiddushin 73a, 373.
Baba Kamma 99b, 580.
Aboth I, 11.
Hullin 15a, 71.
Ibid.
Baba Bathra 89a, 368.
Bezah 15b, 78.
Gittin 14a, 51.
Bekoroth 8a, 51.
Berakoth 27b, 166.
Thonssen & Baird, op. cit., p. 79.
Pesahim 6b, 24.
Aboth II, 4.
Aboth V, 7.
Sanhedrin 38b, 246.
Erubin 21b, 148; 54b, 383; Ta'anith 7b, 30; Berakoth 10a, 53.
Shabbath 3a, 15.
Yoma 87a, 436.
Hullin 75b, 416.
Menahoth 108b, 416.
Aboth de Rabbi Nathan X, 58.
Yoma 4b, 15.
Shabbath 30b, 136.
Pesahim 66a, 333.
Megillah 10b, 58.
Hagigah 3b, 9.
Hullin 100a, 555.
Berakoth 31a, 189.
Sanhedrin 102a, 694.
Shabbath 38a, 175.
Bezah 28a, 145.
Menahoth 18a, 116.
Yebamoth 61b, 408; Baba Mezi'a 18b, 112.
Makkoth 3b, 12.
Sanhedrin 102a, 694.
Sanhedrin 30b, 187.
Mo'ed Katan 5a, 24; Me'ilah 5a, 12.
Baba Bathra 22a, 110.
Bezah 25b, 132.
Thonssen & Baird, op. cit., P. 79.
Shabbath 150a, 764.
Hullin 63b, 346.
Yebamoth 62b, 416; passim. It was felt by the rabbis that failure to perform bodily functions caused impotence. It was impolite to leave the lecture hall during a speech. Since the students of R. Huna had to suppress their bodily functions, it was felt that many of them became impotent due to the length of his lectures.
Sanhedrin 92a, 617.
Kiddushin 58a, 290.
Kiddushin 2a, 1.
Hullin 137a, 790.
Ginzberg, "Baraita of the Thirty-two," op. cit., p. 521.
Megillah 9a, 49; Sukkah 27b, 121.
Aboth II, 4.
Aboth II, 7.
Erubin 53a, 370.
Kiddushin 31b, 154.
Shebu'oth 36a, 212.
Sanhedrin 92a, 617.
Aboth de Rabbi Wathan I, 6.
Baba Mezi'a 58b, 347.
Sanhedrin 24a, 136.
Kethuboth 5a, 17.
Shabbath 63a, 296.
Erubin 21b, 150.
Tamid 29a, 141.
Sotah 49a, 265; Sanhedrin 38b, 246.
Menahoth 82a, 498.
Erubin 53b, 372.
Horayoth 13b, 102.
Aboth de Rabbi Nathan XVIII, 91.
Baba Mezi'a 104a, 594.
Niddah 26b, 182.
Kethuboth 8b, 38.
Nazir 49b, 185.
Baba Bathra 145b, 627.
Thonssen & Baird, op. cit., p. 81.
Aboth I, 11.
Erubin 53a, 370.
Berakoth 13a, 76; Sotah 32b, 161.
Erubin 54a, 374.
Sotah 32b, 160.
Berakoth 22a, 131.
Kiddushin 30a, 144.
Berakoth 45a, 275.
Yoma 20b, 89.
Megillah 24b, 147; 32a, 194; Erubin 54a, 377.
Erubin 60a, 421.
Strack, op. cit., p. 20.
Temurah 14a, 97.
Schechter, op. cit., p. 148.
Morris, op. cit., p. 124.
Megillah 6b, 30.
Erubin 54b, 383.
Ibid
Erubin 54b, 383.
Erubin 54b, 381.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 54b, 383.
Megillah 6b, 30.
Erubin 54a, 377.
Ta'anith 7b, 30.
Megillah 32a, 194.
Morris, op. cit., p. 123.
Zebahim 49b, 249.
Baba Bathra 160a, 700.
Zebahim 28b, 141.
13
48
148
166