Bodner, G. E. and Lindsay, D. S. (2002).  Remembering and knowing in context.  Journal of Memory and Language, 48, 563-580.

 

Introduction

Remember and know judgments are often used in memory studies as a means for measuring the phenomenological experience of the participants involved.  Past research has shown that the two judgments can function independently.  Some experimental manipulations may affect only one type of judgment, whereas others may affect them both, either in an opposite or a parallel manner.  For example, deep levels of processing (LOP) at encoding led to more remember responses than shallow LOP, but this manipulation had no effect on the amount of know judgments.  Bodner & Lindsay have taken this LOP effect and added it to a list context manipulation to determine its effect on the subjective experience of memory. 

 

Tulving (1985) draws the distinction between the two judgments in that “remembering” is often accompanied by the specific recollection of episodic details from the encoding phase, and “knowing” is the result of semantic memory.  So to explain the LOP effect, we would have to assume that deep LOP increases activation in episodic memory leading to more remember judgments, but semantic activation would remain equivalent with both deeper and shallower processing, thus no effect of know judgments.  Rajaram (1996, 1998) suggests that that remembering increases when the distinctiveness or salience of items is increased, and knowing increases when fluency is maximized.

 

Dual process models can also be used to explain the data from remember/know procedures.  This approach suggests that people base recognition judgments on either recollection or familiarity, which forms a distribution of memory strength.  A threshold is set along this line at the point where participants will accept the word as old (if it falls above) or label it as new (if it falls below).  Furthermore, at the point where subjects will consider a word old, they set another criterion to divide these recognition judgments into remember and know. 

 

Gruppuso et al. (1997) proposes that recollection and familiarity should be defined in functional terms.  Recollection would occur when a person’s memory is sufficient for performing a necessary task.  Familiarity, on the other hand, is when memory is sufficient enough to alert one that a stimulus is familiar, but insufficient to accomplish the task at hand. Lastly, some kinds of information contributes to familiarity rather than to recollection, and vice versa.    

 

Experiment 1

To test the influence of context on remember/know judgments, Bodner & Lindsay created a paradigm consisting of three LOP tasks (shallow, medium, and deep).  These were combined to make two groups for each experiment: medium-with-shallow and medium-with-deep.  After both lists were presented, subjects were given a R/K recognition test with words from both lists as well as an equal number of new words. 

 

Results:  Both test-list context and LOP encoding factors influenced whether or not subjects were willing to claim remember or know to recognized items.  More specifically, medium LOP items were more likely to be classified as remembered and less likely to be classified as known when mixed with shallow rather than deep LOP items.

 

Experiment 2

The procedure used was identical to that of experiment one except that only one of the two sets of LOP items was presented along with the new items on the test.  This was designed to test whether the effect of list context arises at test rather than during study.

 

Results:  The overall level of recognition for medium items was similar to that found in experiment 1, and was not affected by whether the other LOP task provided at study was the shallow or deep LOP task.  More importantly, the LOP task had no influence on the rate of R/K judgments given to the medium items.

 

Experiment 3

The same encoding process was used as in experiments 1 and 2.  During the recognition test, however, subjects were given a list-source task rather than a R/K task.  The new task included determining whether each word was presented in list 1, list 2, one of the two but uncertain about which one, or neither. 

 

Results:  The proportion of correct source judgments for medium items did not differ between the medium-with-shallow and medium-with-deep groups.  Also, subjects showed a tendency to label new words as having been presented in the shallower of the two lists.

 

Experiment 4

Experiment 4 had two main goals.  First, it aimed to examine if subjects’ reported strongest recollections would differ as a function of the test-list context.  To accomplish this, subjects were asked to rate the extensiveness of their recollection for the current item then report it to the experimenter in addition to the R/K judgments.  The secondary goal was to ensure that the medium-with-shallow group were not just placing high confidence responses that were not associated with any recollected details into the remember category.  

 

Results:  The medium-with-shallow group was again more likely than the medium-with-deep to judge their recognition of medium items as an experience of remembering.  Furthermore, the medium-with-shallow group was more likely to report thoughts and associations as their strongest recollection whereas the medium-with-deep group was more likely to report recollections for list source.

 

Conclusion

· The influence of test-list context cannot be explained by an account that attributes remember responses to episodic memory and know responses to semantic or perceptual memory. 

· The test-list context effect of experiments 1 and 4 can be explained by Rajaram’s distinctiveness/fluency theory for R/K judgments assuming that medium items were processed more distinctively when tested in the presence of shallow items than in the presence of deep items.

· The signal detection model can accommodate the list-context effects if it is assumed that medium-with-deep group sets a more conservative R/K criterion.  However, this does little to aid in the understanding of the state of conscious awareness that accompanies recognition.

·Therefore, Gruppusso et al’s theory that Ss not only respond differently on R/K tasks, but have different phenomenological experiences all together is the most applicable to Boder and Lindsay’s results. 


 

University of Arkansas

Department of Psychology

Graduate Program in Experimental Psychology

Lampinen Lab

False Memory Reading Group

False Memory Reading Group Fall 2003